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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals in
this matter is pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-22(3) (j) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Defendant

Chadaz

has

stated

several

issues

for

review, many of which are not in the Memorandum Decision
issued by the Court as a final order on the Summary
Judgment, which decision is in the record from page 327 331 and dated October 21, 1997.

The Court would be

benefitted by reading that Memorandum Decision which is
attached as Addendum "F" to Defendant Chadaz 7 s brief.
Issue number 3 in Defendant's brief that the Trial
Court should have made additional findings in accordance
with rule 52 (a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
satisfied when the Court issued the Memorandum Decision
dated October 21, 1997, Addendum "F" . This decision was
issued in direct response to Chadaz's Rule 52(a) motion
and objections.

Therefore, Rule 52(a) is satisfied by

the October 21, 1997, decision.
Next, Defendant Chadaz lists as an issue whether
there

were

material

facts

as

to

whether

or

not

an

easement existed over the property owned by Potters. The
Trial Court in large measure dealt solely with the law
and held as a matter of law that Defendant Chadaz did not
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have an easement, citing Chadaz's failure to reserve an
easement to herself when she first made the conveyance,
and now that Chadaz was a stranger to the deed, Heritage
Park Plaza, Inc. could not reserve to Chadaz something
that Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. did not own.

The Trial

Court Order relied upon the traditional rule and the Utah
precedent in Johnson v. Peck 63 P.2d 251

(Utah 1936),

which Defendant Chadaz has failed to cite in her brief,
and the case of Thomson v. Wade, 69 N.Y.2d 570; 516
N.Y.S.2d 614; 509 N.E.2d 309 (N.Y. 1987) , the law in New
York, which Utah follows.
The Court also ruled as a matter of law, that the
consideration in the contract or deed containing the
easement was the purchase of property to build a road,
which

purchase

construction
commenced.
the

on

was
the

never

anticipated

nor

subdivision

was
ever

The roadway was not completed as required in

contract by October

complete

consummated,

the

The

Court

the

consideration

precedent

failed,

time,

to

agreement, claim or right with respect to the same.

conditions

that

failure

any

the

at

the

vitiated

held

roadway

1, 1981 and

entirely
and

failed,

concluded

that

the

intended use or purpose of the easement was therefore
frustrated and if any easement ever did exist, the same
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was nullified.

The Trial Court found that Defendant's

rights, if any, were similar to a third party beneficiary
to a failed contract.

Defendant's cause of action, in

that case, is not for specific performance against Potter
who is a stranger to the agreement, but for damages, if
any, against one of the parties to the failed agreement
such as Heritage Park Partners.

Defendant Chadaz has

failed to address this issue in her Appellant Brief.
Plaintiff

Potter

specifically

states

that

the

Memorandum Decision issued October 21, 1997 adequately
sets forth the reasons why the Court as a matter of law
granted the Summary Judgment and why, based on the facts
before it, there are no genuine issues of material fact
to prevent Summary Judgment in Plaintiff's favor.
the record 32 7 - 331 and Addendum

f, fl

F

See

to the Defendant's

Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs Potter (hereafter "Potter") filed a Quiet

Title Action on their land.
on the east 66 feet.

Chadaz claimed an easement

Potter filed for summary judgment

and after a hearing the Court grated the summary judgment
denying any easement.
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Potter requests that the Appellate Court uphold the
Trial Court judgement, that Defendant Chadaz conveyed all
of her property away and failed to make the reservation
of an easement.

Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. could not

reserve to Chadaz something that Chadaz no longer owned.
Chadaz attempted to correct this problem, but the attempt
was inadequate since she no longer was in privity of
contract with Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. and Villatek,
Inc.

Chadaz's late attempt to purchase the easement

using

a

Quit

Claim

Deed

after

Potter

purchased his property was of no effect.

had

already

Potter had

become a bona fide purchaser and the Quit Claim deed was
conveyed to Chadaz by a defunct corporation that had no
rights to convey.

If Chadaz wanted the easement, she

should have requested that it be conveyed to her directly
by either Villatek or by Heritage Park Plaza in a deed of
conveyance in 1980.
In addition, Defendant Chadaz is further barred by
the

law

regarding

bona

fide

purchasers,

failure

of

consideration and purpose envisioned in the contracts,
failure

of

conditions

precedent

and

abandonment or termination and estoppel.

subsequent,
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B.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On May 12, 1980, Floyd and Reta Chadaz, the

Defendant

herein

(hereafter

"Chadaz"),

owned

approximately 47.12 acres, which land they agreed to sell
on contract to Heritage Park Partners.

(See Chadaz's

Addendum "A", R. Vol I, Page 124-136).
2.

The Legal title was transferred by Chadaz to

Hi 11am Abstracting by Warranty Deed on May 12, 1980,
without reserving or retaining a right-of-way to their
property.

(See Potter's Addendum #1, R. Vol I, Page

137) .
3.
Trustee,

Hi11am Abstracting and Insurance Agency, Inc.,
(as agent for Chadaz) conveyed approximately

1.58 acres to Heritage Park Partners outright by Warranty
Deed dated May 12, 1980.

(See Potter's Addendum #2, R.

Vol I, Page 138). This Warranty Deed did not reserve a
right-of-way to Chadaz.
4.

On October

24, 1980 Heritage

Park

Partners

transferred the 1.58 acres to Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.
(This warranty deed did not reserve any right-of-way) .
(See Chadaz's Addendum "C", R. Vol. II, Page 261).
5.

On or about October 24, 1980 (note this is prior

to the November 25, 1980 Supplemental Agreement, Chadaz's
Addendum

!I n

B ) , Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. transferred the
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1.58 acres to Villatek, Inc. (a stranger to the original
sale

between

Chadaz

and

Heritage

Park

Partners)

by

Special Warranty Deed which was recorded December 9,
1980.

(See Chadaz's Addendum "D". R. Vol I, Page 146).

This conveyance purported to reserve a right-of-way for
Chadaz, who was a third party stranger to that deed, and
contained the language "subject to a right-of-way over
the East 66 feet of said property, for the purpose of a
proposed road."

This roadway was to be completed before

October 1, 1981 according to the Supplemental Agreement
marked as Chadaz's Addendum "B" R. 139 - 145.

Note, the

easement did not benefit either Villatek or Heritage Park
Plaza, Inc., but only Chadaz or Hi11am Abstract.
6.

The consideration for the transfer from Heritage

Park Plaza, Inc. to Villatek, Inc. mentioned above is
found in an unrecorded Agreement dated November 14, 1980
between those two parties which stated:
Purchasers have agreed

that

"Whereas, said

in order to induce

said

vendors to sell subject property for an amount which has
been determined and agreed upon by both parties herein,
they will assume certain responsibilities in connection
with

said

property."

Those

responsibilities

were:

"Purchasers agree[d] to develop a road over the East 66
feet of subject property, which road shall be approved by

7
the

City

of

Tremonton,

prior

to

development,

and

dedicated to same City of Tremonton, following completion
of development, said development to commence on or before
June 1, 1981."
Page

102) .

(See Potter's Addendum # 3 , R. Vol I,
Thus,

the

right-of-way

was

contingent upon Villatek, Inc. commencing

absolutely
development

before June 1, 1981 and completing development of the
roadway prior

to October

1, 1981 and dedicating

the

roadway to the City of Tremonton upon completion.
7.

On November 25, 198 0, Chadaz entered into a

Supplemental Agreement with Heritage Park Partners and
Triple S Development, Inc, wherein one of the conditions
of the Supplemental Agreement was that Heritage Park
Partners agreed that when the 1.58 acres was further sold
or conveyed

to a third party,

that there would be a

reservation of a 66 foot wide roadway from Main Street to
the Seller's (Chadaz) remaining property. This provision
in paragraph 4 of said Agreement

stated:

"It being

specifically provided that this roadway will be complete
with curb, gutter, sidewalks, sewer, and pavement, and
shall

be

completed

Consequently,

the

prior

to

reservation

contingent upon Buyer completing
October 1, 1981.

October
for

a

1,

1981."

roadway

was

that roadway before

Completion of the roadway became part

8
of the consideration for purchase of said property.

(See

Chadaz's Addendum "B", R. Vol I, Page 107).
8.

The November 24, 19 80 Supplemental Agreement was

not recorded.

Note also that Heritage Park Partners had

already sold the 1.58 acres to Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.
before this Supplemental Agreement was signed.
9.
never

Villatek, Inc. defaulted in its Agreement and
began

transferred

construction
the property

of

the

roadway

to Bradley

J.

and

then

Jorgensen on

February 25, 1982, which was after the completion date of
the roadway without mentioning the roadway or right-ofway.

This was transferred by Warranty Deed with no

mention of the right-of-way.

(See Potter's Addendum #4,

R. Vol I, Page 169) . Heritage Park Partners and Heritage
Park Plaza both defaulted and Hillam Abstract returned
the property back to Chadaz, R. Vol I, Page 8 5 paragraph
11) .
10.

Subsequently,

foreclosed

upon

Bradley

pursuant

to

J.

power

Jorgensen
of

sale

and

was
his

property was transferred by the Trustee to Golden Spike
State Bank with no mention of the right-of-way or any
roadway.
- 173) .

(See Potter's Addendum #5, R. Vol I, Pages 171
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11.

Golden Spike Bank then went into foreclosure and

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation liquidated the
property and sold the property by Quit Claim Deed to
James Holmgren without mentioning any right-of-way.

(See

Potter's Addendum #6, R. Vol I, Page 174).
12 . James Holmgren then transferred the property to
Gary Bywater by Warranty Deed without any mention of the
right-of-way or any roadway.

Bywater's purchased the

land, and the title insurance policy gave no notice of
any recorded right-of-way. (See Potter's Addendum # 7 # R.
Vol I, Page 176).
13.

On July 23, 1993, Gary Bywater

subsequently

transferred part of the property to Potter, the Plaintiff
herein, by Warranty Deed without mentioning any right-ofway.

This conveyance

Chadaz

property

property.

so

it

severed
no

the property

longer

abutted

from the
Chadaz's

(See Potter's Addendum # 8 , R. Vol I, Page

177) .
14.

Potters also had a title search which did not

reveal any recorded easements except pole line, drainage
and ditch easements, one of which was to Floyd Chadaz.
(See Potter's Addendum # 9, R. Vol I, Pages 8 - 12).
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15. Accordingly,

every

transfer

of

the property

since Villatek, Inc. owned the property was made with no
mention of an easement or right-of-way.
16.
easement.

The Subject property has never been used for an
A large ditch crosses the property preventing

any traffic from crossing said ditch, and the embankment
from main street dropped off sharply.

The 66 foot right-

of-way that is asserted by Chadaz has never been in
existence

or used by any party.

(See Affidavit

of

Potters marked as Addendum # 10, R. Vol I, Pages 165168) .
17.
to

build

Potters, to assure themselves that it was safe
on

this

property,

called

Chadaz

prior

to

building on the property and asked specifically if she
had any objections to him building or constructing across
said property that she make those objections known to the
City of Tremonton at a zoning meeting. Chadaz's response
was

that

it would make no difference.

(See Zoning

Meeting Minutes attached as Potter's Addendum # 11, R.
Vol I, Page 166 and Vol I, Page 155 - 159).
18 . Potters then proceeded to build on the property.
They filled the property with several tons of gravel,
building the property up so one could enter the property
from Main street.

Prior to that, where Chadaz claims

11
this right-of-way allegedly existed, one could not enter
from the street.

There was no visible evidence on the

land in 1993 or now that an easement had ever existed,
(See Potter's Addendum #10, R. Vol I, Pages 165 - 168).
19.

Chadaz has access to her property from several

different locations, including from 100 South directly
off of Main Street, 200 South, 400 South and 600 South.
(See Potter's Addendum #12, R. Vol I, Page 154, attached
showing the roads that are available to the Defendant to
reach her property without crossing over Dean Potter's
property and Gary Bywater's property.) From this Exhibit
it can be noticed that the Bywater property separates the
Potter property from the Chadaz property. Therefore, the
Chadaz property no longer abuts the Potter property.
20.

Chadaz never claimed a right-of-way until 1995,

two years after Potters' purchase on July 23, 1993 and
after

all

improvements

were

made.

(See

Potters

Affidavit, Addendum #10 paragraphs 5 and 6, R. Vol I,
Pages 165 - 168 and Maurice Staples Affidavit, Potter's
Addendum # 13, R. 99 - 100).
21.

Chadaz, after Potters denied her easement on

May 2, 1996, attempted to obtain the easement by Quit
Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. (See Potter's
Addendum # 14, R. Vol I, Page 148). This occurred only
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because Potters had refused to permit Chadaz any easement
claim.

Heritage

Park

Plaza,

Corporation as of October, 1983.

Inc.

was

a

defunct

(See Potter's Addendum

#15) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Potter's argument, which follows current Utah law,
is that Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. could not create or
reserve an easement to Chadaz when it transferred the
property

to

Villatek,

Inc.

The

majority

of

jurisdictions, including Utah, follow the traditional
rule which states that one is not permitted to reserve an
easement

to

a

third

person,

who

does

not

own

the

property, while conveying property to another. The logic
behind the rule is that one cannot reserve something for
another which that person does not own or have rights to.
This also creates certainty in title and protects bona
fide purchasers.

Since Chadaz had conveyed away all of

her property and did not retain any of her property,
Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. could not reserve an easement
in favor of Chadaz.
the property

and

no

Chadaz no longer had any rights to
easement

could

vest

in Chadaz.

Likewise, Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. could not create an
easement in land that it did not own.

Heritage Park

Plaza, Inc. did not yet own the other acreage which was
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still held by Hi11am Abstract.

For those reasons, the

attempted reservation failed and would not be noticed by
subsequent purchasers of the existence of an easement.
In addition, the Trial Court found that the purpose
for the easement and the consideration for the easement
both failed.

The easement was to be constructed for the

development of a proposed subdivision.

Villatek, Inc.

was supposed to build the easement or roadway, and in
exchange would receive, in part payment, the 1.58 acres.
However, Villatek failed to build the road and Heritage
Park Plaza, Inc. failed to develop the subdivision. Both
the purpose for the road (i.e. the subdivision) and the
consideration for the property (i.e. the roadway) failed
and

the

purpose

for

the

easement

was

frustrated.

Villatek, Inc. transferred the property to a subsequent
purchaser without reserving or mentioning the easement.
Chadaz apparently foreclosed on Heritage Park Partners on
the balance of land and Hi11am Abstract transferred the
property

back

to

Chadaz

by

mentioning any right-of-way.
foreclosed

upon by

Warranty

purchasers

easement.

Nearly

without

thirteen

without

The other 1.58 acres was

federal banks

subsequent

Deed

and

any

transferred

mention

(13) years

of

to
the

later, Potter

purchased the property through a Warranty Deed without
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any mention of the easement.
reveal

any

recorded

The title search did not

easement.

All

of Mr.

Potter's

inquiries, even to the Defendant Chadaz, revealed no
easement across the property. Plaintiff Potter proceeded
to purchase and build on the property.
The Trial Court found under contract law and the
facts as listed above, that the purpose for the easement
failed,
failed

that
and

terminated.
this

any

that

any

precedent

consideration

or

for

subsequent

the

easement

The parties who were initially a part of

subdivision

easement

conditions

because

also recognized
they

also

the

failed

failure
to

of the

transfer

the

easement to any subsequent purchasers or even to the
Defendant Chadaz herself.
For the above reasons and others, Potters were bona
fide

purchasers

of

the

land

without

constructive knowledge of any easement.

actual

or

Even if Chadaz

could argue that Potter should have been on notice that
there used to be a claim of right-of-way in 1980 across
his property, the above facts and case law show that the
easement

never

came

into

existence.

Potter

also

conducted a diligent inquiry regarding the property and
learned to his satisfaction that no one was claiming an
easement across the property and proceeded to purchase
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and build on the property.

It was not until after he

built on the property that Chadaz complained.
For the same reasons as stated above the Court also
concluded that the parties merely attempted to create an
easement and the creation never succeeded.

The property

was never used for a roadway or easement prior to 1980 or
after 1980.

There were ditches and large embankments

throughout the property which prevented effective use of
that property for the purpose of the alleged easement.
There has never been a subdivision plat filed with the
city of Tremonton showing the proposed road or easement.
The property has never been developed as a subdivision.
The City7 s master plan does not show the proposed road as
an extension of its plan.

The property has been used as

farm land from 1980 until the present.
of

any

roadway

was

abandoned

by

The construction

Villatek

in 1980.

Potter's property has now been severed from Chadaz's
property and no longer abuts Potter's property.

The

Defendant Bywaters' own property that is located between
Plaintiff s property and Defendant' s property. Defendant
Chadaz has taken action inconsistent with any claim of an
easement across said property and should not be allowed
to attempt to revive this old purposed road which was
abandoned long ago.
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Defendant Chadaz has several other access roads to
her property.
to

the

The other entrances allow access similar

claimed

access

road

that

she

desires.

Her

property can still be used for the purposes which she
claims.

However,

if the easement

is allowed

across

Potter's land he cannot use his property as contemplated.
The burdens to Potter far outweigh any evidence that an
easement ever existed.
Chadaz claims she needs a hearing over whether there
was an abandonment or an estoppel.

However, the Court

considered the purpose for the easement in the contracts
and found the purpose was abandoned, foreclosed upon and
terminated.

The parties agreed and stipulated that the

development had been abandoned, the roadway was never
built, and that the property had been foreclosed upon.
Heritage Park Partners, through Hillam Abstract, when it
turned property

back

to Chadaz, never mentioned

any

easement to Chadaz. The Court interpreted this evidence
as a clear and distinct abandonment of the easement. The
Court found that the easement terminated by its own terms
because it was never built or dedicated to the City of
Tremonton by October 1, 1981 as required.

When this

subdivision was abandoned, the easement was abandoned
with it.
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The Court also found that the evidence was clear
that Chadaz never complained or asserted her right to the
easement until after Potter had built upon the property.
The Court considered Chadaz friend's affidavit and found
that Potter's Affidavit in rebuttal to it showed the true
facts on when Chadaz first complained or asserted her
right to the easement.

On that issue there were no

material issues of fact in dispute.
Court ruled that Chadaz was estopped

As a result the
from trying to

reassert this easement, particularly when she had several
other access roads to her property, all of which were
equally suitable to Chadaz's purposes.
REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH FOLLOWS THE TRADITIONAL RULE WHICH STATES
THAT ONE CANNOT RESERVE AN EASEMENT IN A THIRD
PERSON WHILE CONVEYING PROPERTY TO ANOTHER.
(a) Chadaz failed to reserve the easement
before she transferred the property to
Heritage Park Partners and Heritage
Park Plaza cannot reserve it for
Chadaz.
The traditional rule, still valid in the majority of
jurisdictions

including Utah, states that one is not

permitted to reserve an easement to a third person while
conveying property to another.
P.2d

251

(Utah 1936),

See Johnson v. Peek, 63

(a case which involved a deed
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containing a recital that the conveyance was subject to
a right-of-way for the benefit of adjoining land).

In

Johnson v. Peck, the grantor had previously conveyed the
adjoining land by a deed and no longer owned the land,
just as Chadaz did in this case.

The Utah Court stated

on page 254 the following:
"The language of the recital in question is
'subject to a right of way ... for the use and
benefit of the land adjoining said ground on
the west. . . .' This clearly is not the vesting
of any newly created right in the grantor Baird
Realty Investment Company. That company had no
right or interest in the land to the west,
having conveyed it away some two years before.
The recital in the deed could not vest any
right of easement in a stranger to the deed,
(citation to New York Law) . " (Emphasis added)
In the present case, Chadaz conveyed away all of her
rights to the 47.12 acres and the 1.58 acres to Heritage
Park Partners without reservation or exception for a
right-of-way.
the 1.58

acres to Heritage

reservation
Heritage

Heritage Park Partners also conveyed away

or

Park

exception
Plaza,

Inc.

Park Plaza, Inc. without

for

a

right-of-way.

conveyed

the

When

property

to

Villatek, Inc. it attempted to reserve a right-of-way
across the 1.58 acres for the benefit of a third party,
i.e, Chadaz, who no longer owned the property.

Because

Chadaz is now a stranger to the deed and not in privity
of contract or conveyance with Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.
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and Villatek,

Inc., the attempted reservation

cannot

create a valid interest in favor of Chadaz.
UTAH FOLLOWS NEW YORK LAW ON THIS ISSUE.
In a New York case, which is on point, with facts
almost identical to those in the case at bar, the court
found that Plaintiff did not have a right-of-way over
Defendants' land for the benefit of his property.

See In

the Matter of the Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 69 N.Y.2d
570; 516 N.Y.S.2d 614; 509 N.E.2d 309 (New York 1987),
where Plaintiff and Defendant owned adjoining parcels of
land near the St. Lawrence River.
had

a motel

built

on

it

and

Plaintiff's property
fronts

on

the

river.

Defendant's unimproved parcel was between Plaintiff's
land and a public road.

Both parcels were previously

owned by Edward John Noble, who in 1945, separately
conveyed them to Defendant's predecessor and Plaintiff's
predecessor.

Although Noble had always used Defendant's

parcel to gain access to the public road from the motel
property,
Plaintiffs,

in
he

transferring
did

not

the

reserve

motel
an

property

express

to

easement

appurtenant over Defendant's parcel for the benefit of
the motel property. When Noble subsequently conveyed the
unimproved parcel to Defendants, he attempted to reserve
to himself personally and to Plaintiff a right-of-way
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across Defendant's parcel to the public road.

Sometime

later, the Plaintiff acquired from the Noble Foundation
a quit claim deed to the right-of-way over Defendant's
property that Noble had tried to reserve for himself and
Plaintiffs. The Court ruled that Noble could not reserve
a

right-of-way

to

land

he did not

own.

The

Court

reasoned in Wade at page 310:
"It is axiomatic that Noble could not create an
easement benefiting land which he did not own
(see, 3 Powell, Real Property, easements by
express conveyance paragraph, 4 07) .
Thus,
having already conveyed the annexed parcel, he
could not 'reserve' in the deed to defendant's
predecessor in interest an easement appurtenant
to the annexed parcel for the benefit of
plaintiff's predecessor in interest.
A long
accepted rule in this state holds that a deed
with a reservation or exception by the grantor
in favor of a third party, a so called
' stranger to the deed' , does not create a valid
interest in favor of that third party."
The Court indicated the policy reasons for following the
general rule as follows:
"Although application of the 'stranger to the
deed' rule may, at times, frustrate a grantor's
intent, any such frustration can readily be
avoided by the direct conveyance of an easement
of record from the grantor to the third party.
The overriding considerations of the 'public
policy favoring certainty in title to real
property, both to protect bona fide purchasers
and to avoid conflicts of ownership, which may
engender needless litigation' persuade us to
decline to depart from our settled rule. We
have previously noted that in this area of law,
'where it can reasonably be assumed that
settled rules are necessary and necessarily
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relied upon, stability and adherence
to
precedent are generally more important than a
better or even a "correct" rule of law' .
Consequently, we hold here that any right of
way reserved to plaintiff's predecessor in
interest
in
the
defendant's
deed
was
ineffective to create an express easement in
plaintiff's favor." Id at 310.
The court went on to discuss the fact that when Plaintiff
attempted to obtain the right-of-way by a quit claim deed
from Noble, the original grantor, it was of no benefit
and stated as follows:
"Additionally, inasmuch as the right of way
reserved to Noble personally was not shown to
be commercial in nature, the appellate division
correctly determined that it could not be
transferred to plaintiff in the quit claim deed
by the Noble foundation.
Thus, neither the
reservation of an easement in gross in Noble,
nor the reservation of a right of way in
plaintiff's predecessor in interest, entitles
plaintiff
to an express easement
across
defendant's property." Id at 310.
The above case is directly on point and entitles Mr.
and Mrs. Potter to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Utah Law follows New York Law as previously shown in the
case of Johnson v. Peck, Id.
Accordingly, Chadaz cannot claim any benefit to the
right-of-way since she was both a stranger to the deed
and did not own the 47.12 acres at the time for it was
legally titled and owned by Hi11am Abstract for Heritage
Park Partners.

Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.'s attempted
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reservation

of

a right-of-way

party, was void.
reserve

to Chadaz

for Chadaz, the

third

Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. could not
something

that

neither

Chadaz nor

Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. owned; they had no benefitted
property.

Chadaz' failure to seek a direct conveyance of

the right-of-way when she first transferred the property
to Heritage Park Partners was fatal and could not be
corrected by having Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. make the
reservation for her.

Chadaz's attempt to obtain the

easement by Quit Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza,
Inc. after Potters already had purchased the property was
too late.
REBUTTAL TO CHADAZ CLAIMS.
Chadaz

consistently

ignores

the

reality

that

according to Utah case law an easement cannot be reserved
in favor of a third party, who is a "stranger to the
deed".
instead

Johnson v. Peck, 63 P.2d 251 (Utah 1936) . Chadaz
chooses

to

pretend

that

the

case

law

of

California or Alaska should govern, where neither of
those states are controlling.

Chadaz further tries to

muddle the issue, by claiming that the facts in this case
are controlled by principles of contract law and that the
Court should look at the agreements instead of the wellsettled principles of property law that clearly govern
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the conveyance of real property and the recording of real
estates

instruments.

contract

law

is

Chadaz's

merely

a

red

attempt

to

focus

herring

that

on

has

no

sort

of

relevance to the disposition of this case.
For

instance,

agreement

Chadaz

Partners,

or

conveyance

of

it

entered

other
the

is

irrelevant

what

into

Heritage

with

circumstances
property

in

that

Park

surround

question,

when

the

those

agreements were not recorded in the real estate records
for bona fide purchasers to review.

What is relevant on

this Appeal is that on May 12, 1980, Chadaz conveyed by
Warranty Deed, which was duly recorded, 47.12 acres to
Hi11am Abstract, Inc., without reserving an easement to
herself.

Likewise it is relevant that on May 12, 1980

Hi11am Abstract, Inc., conveyed by Warranty Deed, which
was duly recorded,
Heritage

Park

easement.
138).

1.58

acres of the 47.12 acres to

Partners, again

failing

to reserve an

(See Potter's Addendum # 2 , R. Vol I, Page

It is not relevant that this conveyance was part

of larger transaction between Chadaz and Heritage Park
Partners because Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. (allegedly the
successor or same entity as Heritage Park Partners),
never

made

an

agreement

with

easement in favor of Chadaz.

Chadaz

to

reserve

an

What is truly relevant is
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that Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. attempted to reserve an
easement in the Special Warranty Deed to Villatek, Inc.
to a stranger to the deed, i.e., Chadaz, which action is
ineffective
Chadaz,

to

by

create

an

erroneously

easement
relying

under
upon

Utah

law.

contractual

relationships that existed between herself and Heritage
Park Partners (not Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.) wrongfully
suggests that these contractual duties or obligations
somehow altered or suspended the effect of property law
upon the conveyances of real property that took place.
If Chadaz wants relief from the unsatisfactory results of
those contractual relationship, she should have brought
suit against those parties who were in privity with the
contract.

As the trial court justifiably held:

"The Defendant (Chadaz) essentially claims a
right as third party beneficiary to a failed
contract.
That is not an enforceable right
against a non-party.
In such cases, the
Defendant's relief is not for a specific
performance
against
a
stranger
to
the
agreement, but for damages, if any, as against
one of the parties."
Courts Memorandum
Decision Addendum F, Record 330.
Chadaz also attempts to explain in some detail that
Heritage Park Partners and Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. were
the same entity.

This explanation may be worthy for one

litigating a corporate debt claim arising under the law
of corporations, however, the only fact relevant to this
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discussion is that on October 24, 1980, Heritage Park
Partners

conveyed

recorded,

1.58

by

acres

Warranty

to Heritage

without reserving any easement.
"C",

R. Vol

Deed,

I, Pages 261

which

Park

was

Plaza,

duly
Inc.,

(See Chadaz's Addendum

- 262).

Chadaz

fails to

recognize that her agreement was only with Heritage Park
Partners and Triple S. Development, not Heritage Park
Plaza, Inc.

(See Chadaz's Addendums "A" and "B", R. Vol

I, Pages 124 - 136 and Pages 139 - 145) . Chadaz ignores
the fact that Heritage Park Partners is a partnership,
while Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. is a corporation that
become defunct October 1983. Heritage Park Partners had
two or three partners, while Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.
apparently had several other shareholders.
Chadaz next unsuccessfully attempts to explain why
this Court should find that Chadaz retained an interest
in the real estate and is somehow not a stranger to the
deed back in 1980. Chadaz admits in her argument on page
2 6 of her brief that she did convey the land burdened by
the easement, but then wrongfully misstates the facts
when

she

quotes

that

she

never

conveyed

the

land

benefitted by the easement due to the default of the
buyers.

To come to that conclusion, Chadaz would have to

totally ignore her complete conveyance of property to
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Hillam Abstracting of all 47.12 acres.
Chadaz's

argument

reveals

that

the

An analysis of

transaction

that

occurred between Chadaz and Heritage Park Partners was a
conditional

sale using a trustee as an intermediary.

Chadaz could have chosen a mortgage sale, trust deed
sale,

or

installment

sale,

but

chose

to

use

the

conditional sale substitute, where the seller conveys all
title to the real estate to a trustee under a land sale
contract and the buyer takes possession of the property
as if it were his own and begins to make payments to the
seller for the land.

This device has historically been

used to avoid usuary laws and to avoid the buyers equity
of redemption upon the buyers

default, as generally

required by both mortgage and trust deed law.
sale

contract

generally

provides

that

if

The land
the

buyer

defaults that he must reconvey the land back to the
seller and forfeit all payments previously made to the
seller.
that

the

It is important to note under these contracts
seller's

remedy

is provided

wholly

by

the

if

the

contract and that Seller transfers title away.
What

Chadaz

could

not

explain

is

why,

contract failed and the buyers were in default, all of
the buyer's obligations, including the right to reserve
an easement for Chadaz would have likewise failed and
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disappeared.

Chadaz further fails to explain why she did

not seek a direct conveyance of an easement across the
1.58 acres from the owner of the 1.58 acres.

If she

truly wanted to reserve or maintain an easement across
that land, she should have acquired a deed directly from
Villatek, who was the owner of the 1.58 acres. However,
the facts show that upon default by the buyers that
Chadaz merely received part of her property back from
Hillam Abstracting,

Inc. by a warranty

deed without

reference to any reservation of an easement.

In spite of

all of Defendant Chadaz' labored argumentation, from that
first

conveyance

to Hillam Abstract

forward,

Chadaz

became a stranger to the subsequent deeds, and Utah law
does not allow others to reserve an easement for her
since Chadaz
record.

is no longer

the

legal

title owner of

When Potters reviewed the records, the only

evidence before them as bona fide purchases at that time,
was that Chadaz was a stranger to the deeds when the
easement was attempted to be reserved for her and as a
result the easement failed under traditional Utah law.
Chadaz attempts to discredit both Utah and New York
law by stating that this Court should follow California
law or the law in Alaska.

However, the rational and

strength for following the traditional rule is based upon
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certainty of recorded property law.

The Court in Wade

identified the strength of this position when it stated:
"We have previously noted that in this area of
law, where it can be reasonably be assumed that
sale of rules are necessary and necessarily
relied upon, stability
and adherence
to
precedent are generally more important than a
better or even a 'correct' rule of law." Id.
at page 310.
The second rational for maintaining the traditional rule
is also intertwined with the first. A grantor may easily
convey

an

easement

difficulty.
signing

to

a

third

without

any

The method for doing such is by merely

a deed of

conveyance,

directly to that third party.
advantages:

1.

the

conveying

an

easement

This method has several

The easement appears as a recorded deed

instead of a reservation
improving

party

quality

subsequent purchasers.

in the real estate

of
2.

in the law is maintained.

the

notice

given

records
to

all

The stability and certainty
3.

The purpose and intent of

the grantor is clearly identified and given full effect.
Consequently, the traditional rule regarding strangers to
deed, satisfies both its critics and its proponents.
In any event, Potters at the time they purchased the
property relied upon prior Utah precedent under Johnson
v. Peckf which was the governing and ruling law at that
time, and purchased the property free and clear of the
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easement.

Defendant Chadaz cannot claim that this Court

should now retroactively apply some other state's law.
This

would

retroactively

destroy

Potters

bona

fide

purchaser status when they first purchased this property
in 1993.

Utah has never rejected the traditional rule,

nor has New York, which was the source of the Utah rule.
Obviously the rule remains as controlling precedent,
until the Utah Supreme Court overturns Peck under the
doctrine

of

prospective

stare
effect

decisis
on

the

which
future

would

only

purchases

and

have
not

retroactive effect on the current case.
(b) The Quit Claim Deed transferring the
alleged easement from Heritage Park
Plaza, Inc. to Chadaz failed or three
(3) reasons: (1) This easement is in
gross, personal to Heritage Park
Plaza, Inc. and non-assignable; (2)
Potters are bona fide purchasers
without notice of this Quit Claim
Deed; and (3) Heritage Park Plaza is
a
defunct
corporation
without
authority to transfer.
When the grantor of an easement, such as Heritage
Park Plaza, Inc., does not have any benefitted land (the
dominant estate) , then the easement is treated as one in
gross. See generally, 3 Powell, Real Property, paragraph
405 and 419.

Easements in gross are discouraged because

they encumber land without providing a benefit to another
land owner as previously stated above.

If the easement
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in gross is commercial in nature, it can sometimes be
transferred.

Commercial easements in gross typically

apply to railroad easement, utility easements, billboard
easements, cable easements and sewer easements.
However non-commercial easements in gross are nontransferable.

These easements do not run with the land

and are not appurtenant to the land.

Because of their

personal

to

involved.

nature,
See

they

are

generally

limited

Maw

v.

Conservancy District, 436 P.2d 230

Weber

the

parties

Basin

(Utah 1968)

Water
(which

discusses the personal rights of a father to cross upon
land as a privilege to shoot in a duck club which was
nontransferable to his children.)
In the present case, Villatek, Inc. made a personal
agreement as part of the purchase price of the property
to construct a roadway to benefit Heritage Park Plaza,
Inc. These Agreements were personal in nature since they
were part of the purchase price for the land.

Because

Villatek, Inc. defaulted and never completed development
thereof,

the

land

was

later

foreclosed

upon.

The

foreclosure action likewise terminated the consideration
which included building the road.
personal

covenant

by Villatek,

As a result, this

Inc. was

terminated.

Subsequent servient tenement owners cannot be burdened

31
with a covenant that was personally made by Villatek,
Inc., which covenant was foreclosed upon over sixteen
(16) years ago.

(See generally, Walter v. Introcaso, 135

NJL 461, 52 A.2d 676

(N.J. 1947).

transfer of land to subsequent

Accordingly, the

owners

easement and terminated its existence.

vitiated

the

The easement in

the context of the present case is not commercial since
it applies personally to Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. and
Villatek, Inc., for development of a proposed road.
The Court in Wade, supra 5 09 N.E.2nd 3 09 at page
310, stated:
"Additionally, inasmuch as the right of way
reserved to Noble personally was not shown to
be commercial in nature, the appellate division
correctly determined that it could not be
transferred to plaintiff in the quit claim deed
by the Noble Foundation."
Likewise, because the reservation of the easement by
Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was conditioned on the personal
performance

of Villatek,

Inc., this

easement

became

nontransferable to subsequent owners and the easement
terminated upon transfer.
gross

it

does

not

run

appurtenant to the land.

Because this easement is in
with

the

land

and

is

not

See generally Maw v. Weber

Basin Water Conservancy District, 436 P.2d

230

(Utah
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1968) which held

than an easement

in gross

is non-

transferable.
In addition, Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was a defunct
company by October

1983.

Heritage

Park Plaza, Inc.

attempted to transfer the alleged easement to Chadaz by
Quit Claim Deed on May 2, 1996, nearly three (3) years
after Potter had purchased on July 23, 1993.

Potter was

a bona fide purchaser and did not have notice of any
transfer between Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. and Chadaz
when he originally purchased the property on July 23,
1993.

Consequently,

Potter's

purchase

would

take

priority over the quit claim deed and would be free and
clear of any attempt to restore the easement.

Heritage

Park Plaza, Inc, as a defunct, foreclosed upon entity,
had no authority or rights to transfer in any event.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF IS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER WITHOUT
NOTICE AND THE EASEMENT IS EXTINGUISHED,
(a) Plaintiff as a bona fide purchaser takes
the property free of the easement.
A person who purchases land as a bona fide purchaser
without

knowledge,

actual

or

constructive,

of

the

existence of the easement, takes title to the property
free and clear of the burdens of the easement. Horman v.
Clark, 744 P. 2d 1014 (Utah App. 1987) . Potters were bona
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fide

purchasers

of

the

land

without

actual

or

constructive knowledge of the easement for the following
reasons:
1.

Potters purchased the property from Gary Bywater

under a Warranty Deed which did not show the existence of
any easement.
2.

The Title Company conducted a title search on

the property

and

did

not

find

any

easement

on

the

property.
3.

The Special Warranty Deed from Heritage Park

Plaza, Inc. to Villatek, Inc. as discussed in Point I
above, did not create an easement to Chadaz. In addition
any right-of-way was only for the "purpose of a proposed
road", which road should have been completed June 1, 1981
and never was constructed.

Potters had notice only that

the easement had terminated and was never transferred
properly.
4.
Plaza,

Chadaz was not a party to the Heritage Park
Inc. and Villatek,

Inc. agreement

and

cannot

allege Potters knew she had an easement, especially since
her Quit Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was
nearly three (3) years after Potters purchase.
5.

There were no visible

signs of an

easement

across the property for the purpose of a roadway.

34
6.

Chadaz never gave notice to the Potters when

they began construction of their building and improved
the lot across the alleged easement that she was making
any

claim

for

a

right-of-way

until

long

after

the

improvements were made.
7.

The unrecorded contracts which contain language

concerning the 66 foot right-of-way were never recorded.
8.

There is no plat maps or city street plans which

show this easement.
Potters, as bona fide purchasers, therefore take the
property fee and clear of the easement.
(b) Plaintiff Potters completed their duty
of inquiry by diligently searching out
the status of said property and
purchased said property as bona fide
purchasers free and clear of the
easement.
Chadaz attempts to claim that the mere recording of
a

Special

Warranty

Deed

dated

October

24, 1980

and

recorded December 9, 1980, was sufficient to constitute
constructive notice of the easement to all the world.
Potters have shown that this reservation did not create
an easement.

(See argument Point I ) .

In addition, even that recording indicates that the
property was subject to a right-of-way for "the purpose
of a proposed road."

If the road is not completed as
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proposed, then there is nothing to be "subject to". That
road was never constructed and, as indicated above, the
purpose for the roadway was extinguished by abandonment
of

the

subdivision

development.

All

purchasers

subsequent to Villatek, Inc. purchased the property by
Warranty Deed without any reference to this easement.
The clear intention from these multiple conveyances show
that the property was no longer to be considered for a
subdivision and the need for a roadway no longer existed.
All subsequent conveyances were made free and clear of
any proposed road.
Further, Heritage Park Plaza Inc. is not in privity
with Chadaz since her agreements were all with Heritage
Park Partners, a separate entity.
not

contract

with

Heritage

Park

Defendant Chadaz did
Plaza,

Inc.

for

a

reservation of a roadway and cannot claim title to one
now based on the Quit Claim Deed from this entity, which
was

recorded

long

after

the

Potters

purchased

the

property.
Under

Utah's

Recording

Statute,

an

unrecorded

conveyance is "void as against any subsequent purchaser
in good faith and for valuable consideration of the same
real estate . . . where his own conveyance shall be first
duly recorded."

Utah Code Annotated

§ 57-3-3(1986).
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Thus, "a subsequent purchaser must . . . show that he had
no actual notice, i.e. , no personal knowledge, of a prior
conveyance or that the prior conveyance did not impart
constructive notice."

Diversified Equities, Inc. v.

American Savings and Loan Association,
(Utah App. Ct. 1987) at page 1136.

739 P.2d

1133

Note, the recorded

instrument can only impart to the person notice of its
contents.

The contents of the Special Warranty Deed in

question indicate that it was an easement only for a
"proposed road" to a third party, which is invalid to
create an easement in Utah.

No proposed road was ever

built and no subdivision was completed and the purpose
for said roadway was eliminated.
In Diversified Equities, Inc., a mortgage broker,
acting on behalf of a bona fide purchaser, was ruled to
have met

his duty

of

inquiry when he

conducted

the

following:
(1)
were

A title search was performed and no encumbrances

shown

according

to the title

report, although

a

mortgage had shown once and was released.
(2)
party

He personally

who claimed

contacted

to have

the previous

an encumbrance

secured

against

the

property, which party confirmed what the title search and
other verbal and documentary evidence had told him.
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(3) A physical inspection of the property did not
reveal any such encumbrances.
In Diversified Equities, Inc. the Court ruled:
"While the circumstances were suspicious and
called for inquiry, Pentalude, acting for Peck,
inquired - and with sufficient diligence to
meet the duty imposed by the doctrine of
inquiry notice.
He had a title search
performed and he personally contacted American
even though the results of Rydalches and
Burnetts three prior contacts were accurately if disingenuously - communicated to him and
even though he had a copy of the reconveyance,
American confirmed what the title search, the
reconveyance, Burnett and Rydalch all told him.
Wayne Peck, acting for Dakol and Diversified,
reasonably relied on the title search and the
clear evidence, both documentary and verbal, of
American's reconveyance. American negligently
released its Trust Deed and its security
interest will not be preserved against bona
fide third party purchasers, who, at least on
the facts as stipulated were bona fide
purchasers without notice and without further
duty to inquire.
To hold otherwise would
defeat the purpose of the recording statutes
and subvert the sound commercial policy they
promote." At page 1137.
Although

the

facts

in

this

case

are

slightly

different than those in Diversified Equities, Inc., the
analogies drawn therefrom can be matched with the steps
Potters have taken.
performed
existed.

and

The Potters had a title search

according

to

the

record

no

easement

Potters then personally contacted Chadaz and

informed her they were purchasing the property and going
to build across said property and that if she had any
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difficulties with that she would need to appear at the
zoning commission meetings where the building permit was
to be granted.

Chadaz indicated she was not concerned

and that it would make no difference anyway.

Potters

also personally inspected the property and noted that it
was a field of weeds which dropped sharply off of the
Main Street curb, that there was a large ditch that
prevented

anyone from dropping off of that

crossing said property.

curb and

There were no physical signs

that this property had ever been crossed.
The burden shifted to Chadaz to act to maintain any
claim of a right-of-way that might have existed when bona
fide purchasers were asking her questions about building
on the property which would

effectively

destroy

the

right-of-way. Chadaz cannot remain silent, allow Potters
to build, and then several years later argue that Potters
should

not

have

built

over

the

top

of

her

alleged

easement and then ask the Court to do what she would not
do for herself.
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POINT III
THE EASEMENT WAS ABANDONED OR TERMINATED,
It is well recognized that an easement or right-ofway may be abandoned.

Western Gateway Storage Co. v.

Treseder, 567 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1977) .

To determine the

issue of abandonment several factors are considered among
which

are:

whether

the

right

was

acquired

by

prescription or grant, the extent of its use, and the
actual

intent

of

the

owner.

Nonuse

alone

is

not

sufficient, but when taken with other conduct of the
owner can prove abandonment.

Intent to abandon need not

be an express intent, but could be implied from the
facts.

25 Am. Jur. 2d. Easements and Licenses § 25.

In the present

case, the original

owner of

the

easement abandoned the construction of the roadway and
never did construct a road.

In fact, all the property

was forfeited and foreclosed upon and the roadway never
pursued.
over

The roadway has never been built or used in

sixteen

(16) years.

Subsequent

owners

of

the

property transferred property to other parties without
referencing the easement or ever using said easement.
Potters were allowed to purchase the property and build
thereon by placing buildings, driveways, curb and gutter
and landscaping across the easement without objection or
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complaint by the dominant tenement.

When all of these

actions are considered as a whole, the clear intent is
that the right-of-way never ripened, eventuated or was
forfeited and no longer benefits the owner and subsequent
owners

have

so

recognized

and

allowed

Potters

construct across said easement without complaint.

to

These

actions show that the owner released her claim to the
right-of-way.

See 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses

§ 25.
(a) The terms of the original grant or
deed of easement show that it was in
consideration for the purchase of
property and since the property was
never fully purchased,
construction
of the subdivision was never started,
and development of the road was
abandoned and forfeited.
In Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse
Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975) the Court held
that a change

in conditions which

is of

significant

magnitude can neutralize the benefits of the easement or
the purpose of the easement and therefore render the
easement of little or no value.

See page 1261. Where an

easement has not been created until the happening of a
specific

event

terminate

ipso

event.

or
facto

contingency,
upon

the

easement

the non-happening

will

of that

See Irvin v. Petitfils, 112 P.2d 688 (Cal. 1941)
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and Lyman v. Storage Company, 107 P. 286 (Colo. 1910).
Additionally,

when

a

deed

creates

an

easement,

the

circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of
the parties, and the object to be attained are also to be
considered.

Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d at 353 (Utah 1952) .

In the present case, the easement was only to be
created by Villatek, Inc. constructing a road and then
dedicating

the road to the City of Tremonton, which

construction was to begin on or before June 1, 1981 and
end before October 1, 1981.

Villatek, Inc. never began

construction, the road was never dedicated to the City of
Tremonton, and the proposed road was abandoned. Villatek
filed bankruptcy and could not complete construction of
the

road

and

the

consideration

for purchase

of

the

property was lost and the property forfeited back to the
secured lienholders.

As a result, the contingency for

building the road is an event which never occurred, and
thus the easement was forfeited.
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(b) Failure to use the easement for a
roadway for which the easement was
initially granted, particularly when
the roadway was to be completed by
October 1, 1981, indicates that the
easement is no longer needed and
results in its own termination.
The law specifically provides that an easement will
terminate if the purpose for which it was created was
never enacted and there has been a failure to use the
easement

for a specified period

which

indicates

the

easement is no longer needed and will result in its own
termination.

See generally Mountain Cement Company v.

Johnson, 884 P.2d 30 (Wyo. 1994); 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements
and Licenses §§ 111 and 115.
Where an easement has been created subject to a
condition subsequent, the easement may be terminated by
the exercise of some affirmative act by the servient
owner

upon

the

breach

or

non-performance

of

the

condition.
In addition, where an easement is granted for the
development of a road and the servient tenant obtained
the

property

on

condition

and

for

consideration

of

building a roadway, and then subsequently defaults in
building said roadway, the easement is lost for failure
of consideration.

This

is particularly

true when a

subsequent purchaser at a foreclosure sale lacks notice
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of the easement, since the easement is terminated by said
foreclosure. See generally, Walter v. Introcaso, 135 NJL
461 52 A.2d 676

(N.J. 1947)

(wherein, a purchaser at

foreclosure, even with constructive notice, took the
property free of the easement).
In the instant case, the facts reveal that pursuant
to an Agreement dated November 14, 1980 between Heritage
Park Plaza, Inc. and Villatek, Inc. that Villatek, Inc.
agreed to develop a road over the East 66 feet of the
subject property as consideration for purchase of said
property.
June

1,

This roadway was to be commenced on or before
1981

and

completed

by

October

dedicated to the City of Tremonton.

1,

1981

and

The Supplemental

Agreement dated November 24, 1980 between Reta Chadaz and
Heritage Park Partners and Triple S Development, Inc.
specifically provided that the roadway would be complete
with curb and gutter, sidewalk, sewer and pavement prior
to October 1, 1981.
roadway

is

not

The implication is that if the

completed

and

the

subdivision

not

developed, then the easement's purpose is viated.
Obviously, Heritage Park Partners, Heritage Park
Plaza, Inc. and Villatek, Inc. all defaulted and failed
to construct any roadway on the property.

In fact, the

agreement to development the property for a subdivision
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was

also

in

default

and

declared

forfeited.

No

subdivision exists and no plat has ever been approved to
this

day.

Consequently,

the purpose

for which

the

roadway was initially intended ceased with these defaults
and the roadway was no longer necessary.

That condition

has remained from 1981 through today's date and Defendant
Chadaz still has no formal plans approved by the City of
Tremonton for a subdivision.
When this property was foreclosed on by the trustee
against Bradley Jorgensen, as well as against Golden
Spike State Bank, the subsequent purchasers from those
foreclosures all received title to the property without
notice of said easement.

They were given title to the

property with no reference to the easement. Accordingly,
the easement, by its own terms and purpose terminated
because

Defendant

Chadaz'

failures

to

develop

said

property and the subsequent foreclosures cleared that
property of the easement from thence forward.
(c) Potter's land, the servient parcel,
was severed from the dominant parcel
and no longer abuts against the same,
causing a termination of the easement.
"The

partition

of

the

dominant

tenement

cannot

create a further or additional easement across a servient
tenement, and an easement of way does not enure to the
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benefit of the owner of the parcel which after division
does not abut on the way; and where resulting use will
increase the burden upon the servient estate, the right
to the easement will be extinguished."

Wood v. Ashby,

253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952) at page 354.
In the present case, Chadaz lost at least 1.58 acres
of the dominant parcel to several other owners and Chadaz
currently only owns 35 acres out of the original 47.12
acres.

FDIC foreclosed on the property and transferred

part of the property to Gary and Karleen Bywater.

Gary

Bywater's parcel was split in half and transferred to
Plaintiff Potter.
between

Potter's

Bywater's remaining property is now
property

and

Chadaz's

property

and

therefore Chadaz's property no longer abuts the servient
tenement.

Since

the

dominant

tenement

has

been

partitioned from 47.12 acres to 35 acres and Chadaz's
property no longer abuts on the way to the easement, the
right-of-way is extinguished.

46
POINT IV
CHADAZ IS BARRED BY EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
CLAIMING AN EASEMENT.

FROM

(a) Chadaz is estopped from claiming an
easement.
The case

of Papanikolas

Brothers

Enterprises v.

Sugarhouse Shopping Center, 535 P.2d 1256
discusses

(Utah 1975)

the issue of whether an easement

could be

terminated on grounds of equitable estoppel and ruled
that it could if there was a lack of diligence on the
part of the owner of the dominant estate which resulted
in an injury to the servient estate because of such lack
of diligence.

This is particularly true if you use a

balance of injury test showing that the loss of easement
does not irreparably injure the dominant tenement, and
the cost of having the easement are disproportionate and
impressive compared to the benefits derived from it and
where the dominant tenement can receive access to their
property from other right-of-way points. The doctrine of
balancing the equities or relative hardships is reserved
for innocent servient tenant holders who proceed without
knowledge

or warning

that

another's property rights.

they are

encroaching

upon

See generally pages 1259

through 1261 of Sugarhouse Shopping Center, case above.
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In the present case, the Plaintiff innocently and
without notice, fully believed that they owned their
property

free

and

clear

of

any

easement.

They

constructed a building across the easement complete with
driveways, curb and gutter, cement walls and landscaping.
During the period of construction, the Defendant Chadaz
never objected or attempted to stop construction although
she had the opportunity to do so on several occasions.
Because

she

waited

nearly

two

(2)

years

after

the

improvements were made, she should be equitably estopped
from asserting her rights to the easement.

In addition,

the balance of equities show that Potters would suffer
irreparable harm, losing all of the property purchased,
if they were forced to remove their improvements and
would

lose

business

a

valuable

opportunity

whereas, Defendant

Chadaz

to

expand

has

other

their
access

routes to her property with adequate frontage and still
could obtain rights-of-way from other sources. As such,
the alleged right-of-way should be terminated.
(b) Chadaz is equitably estopped from
trying to revive or claim an easement
across the subject property where she
has allowed Potters, the servient
estate, to take action inconsistent
with her claim of easement with
justifiable
reliance
upon
her
nonaction and statements.

48
An easement may be extinguished by abandonment or
estoppel if the owner of the servient estate takes action
inconsistent

with

the

easement's

continued

existence

based upon reasonable reliance that the owner of the
dominant estate does not intend to make future use of the
servient estate.

See generally, Rollston v. Sea Island

Properties, Inc., 254 GA 183, 327 SE.2d 489, cert, denied
474 U.S. 823 (Ga. 1985) . In addition, a dominant estate
owner's failure to object to development on the servient
estate that interferes with the easement may also result
in abandonment of the easement.

Chase v. Eastman, 563

A.2d 1099 (ME 1989); 25 Am.Jur.2d Easement & Licensing
§ 113 .
In the present

case, the dominant

estate owner,

Chadaz failed to object to the development on Potter's
property when she was given the chance to do so.
never

informed

Potter

that

she

intended

Chadaz

to use

the

easement and there were no physical signs on the property
that it would ever be used.

Potter, upon reasonable

reliance from Chadaz, improved the property and built a
driveway, cement walls, sprinkler line and poured several
tons of gravel into the sunken area to build it up for
access to his building; costing over $15,000.00.

Chadaz

should have reasonably foreseen that Potter would have
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relied on her inaction and her verbal statements to his
detriment.

It is against justice and equity to now

permit her to suddenly argue that her easement has been
revived and she is now going to use that easement as
access to vacant land proposed as a subdivision when no
subdivision currently exists.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Plaintiff Potter is entitled to
Summary Judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that
the easement could not be created in a third person. The
easement was terminated or its purpose abandoned and the
easement never ripened or came into being, the servient
tenement no longer abuts the dominant tenement and Chadaz
is estopped and has other access roads to her property.
Potter requests that the Court of Appeals uphold the
Trial Court decision as correct on those legal issues as
a matter of law and that no material facts presented by
Chadaz justifies taking this case to trial.

DATED this

//T"

day of August, 1998.
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Marlin J. Grant, hereby certify that on the
day of August, 1998, I served two (2) true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to Reed W.
Hadfield and Stephen R. Hadfield, the counsel for the
appellant in this matter, and I served two (2) copies of
the

attached

Defendant,

Brief

and

two

of

Appellee

copies

upon

upon

Gary

Karleen

C.

Bywater,
Bywater,

Defendant, by mailing them to them by first class mail
with

sufficient

postage

prepaid

to

the

following

addresses:
Reed W. Hadfield
Stephen R. Hadfield
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE
98 North Main
P.O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Gary Bywater
375 North 600 West
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Karleen Bywater
375 North 600 West
Brigham City, Utah 84302
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

*^arL£n
Attorney fbj/Plaitffcif f s/Appellees
potter.brf/mjg
T-6480.01
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Warranty Deed from Floyd Chadaz and Reta Chadaz to Hillam
Abstracting & Insurance Agency, Inc.
Warranty Deed from Hillam Abstracting & Insurance Agency,
Inc. to Heritage Park Partners.
Agreement dated November 14, 1980.
Warranty Deed
Jorgensen.

from

Villatek,

Inc.

to

Bradley

J.

Trustee's Deed by John L. Bessinger to Golden Spike State
Bank.
Quit
Claim
Deed
from
Federal
Deposit
Insurance
Corporation as Liquidator of Golden Spike Bank to James
Holmgren.
Warranty Deed from James Holmgren to Bary Bywater and
Karleen C. Bywater.
Warranty Deed from Gary Bywater and Karleen C. Bywater to
Dean R. Potter and Diane B. Potter.
Policy of Title Insurance
Insurance Company.

by

First

American

Title

Affidavit of Dean R. Potter dated December 23, 1996.
Zoning Meeting Minutes and Page 2 of Affidavit of Dean R.
Potter dated December 23, 1996.
Map showing roads available.
Affidavit of Maurice Staples dated November 14, 1996.
Quit Claim Deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. to Reta
Chadaz.
Document from the State of Utah regarding Heritage Park
Plaza, Inc.
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WARRANTY

DEED

FLOYD CHADAZ AND RETA CHADAZ, HIS WIFE
of

Tremonton

hereby CONVEY

. County of

and WARRANT

, grantor S
. State of Utah,

Box E l d e r

to

KILLAM ABSTRACTING & INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Trustee, pursuant to a Trust Agreement dated the 12th day of May,198
, grante%
of

Brigham C i t y

. County of

BOX E l d e r

for the sum of Ten ($10.00) Dollars & other valuable consideations

the following described tract of land in

Box E l d e r

, State of Utah
xxfKSia&RSsx

County, State of Utah, to-wit:

Beg., at a pt. 54.4 ft S. of the N.E.corner of the N.W.1/4
of Sec.lO.T.ll.N.R.3.W.S.L.B & M., and running East 30.0 ft,
thence S.830.8 ft; thence N.83°37,35" E.183.6 ft; thence S.
161.5 ft; thence N.88°37,35M E.103.7 ft; thence S.5°30« W.
337.3 ft; thence N.88°37,35" E.50.0 ft; thence S.5o30' W.
851.3 ft; thence on a curve to the right of 500 foot radius
a distance of 725.4 ft (Note: Chord of said curve bears
S.50o05' W.624.8 ft); thence S.88°37'35M W.423.2 ft along
an established fence which is parallel to the half-section
line and 50 ft N. therefrom; thence N.0°04,10M E.2563.4 ft;
thence N. 88°37 • 35_ M E236.0 ft; thence S.191.3 ft; thence
N.88°37'35M E.410.0 ft; thence N.191.0 ft to the point of beg
containing 47.12 acres.
The sellers reserve the right to remove the two steel
granaries located upon the above described property.
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WITNESS the hand of said grantors, this

day of

, 19 80

May

0~

fea^dzzzy'
wig^r

Reta Chadaz, h i s

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

|

Box E l d e r

On the
12
personally appeared before me
the signer
same.

s

\

J

S3.

day of
Fi0yd

May
^
80
Chadaz and Reta Chadaz, h i s w i f e

of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged toTta that they executed the

UIIM&^L
/

My commission expires

Jan...8.,.l_9£2

Residing in

APPROVED FORM — UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION
FORM l O I - WARRANTY DCCD - KCU.V CO.. • • W. NINTH SO- • l-C L U O t

Notary Public

Bxi^ajft_Ci£y^p.tal}
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JC^YL^A^
De

PUty

Harratttu; §e?a
(Corporate Form)

^
1^
»*

HILLAM ABSTRACTING & INSURANCE AGENCY, I N C , TRUSTEE, a coi-p.iialio,,
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at
Brighara C i t y
, of County of
Box E l d e r
. Slate of Utah,
grantor, hereby conveys and warrants to

^5

HERITAGE PARK PARTNERS

J
3
*

of

K a y s v i l l e , Davis County,
Ten and N o / 1 0 0
the following described tract of land in
State of Utah:

^
1
-J

$
\
•*
I A\p
,il 'V
i^j
4

State

Granteo
for the sum of
DOLLARS,
County,

o f Utah
Box E l d e r

Beginning at a point, said point being South 54 feet
and West 410 feet from the Northeast Corner of the
North half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian,
thence running South 291.63 feet, thence West 236
feet, thence North 291.63 feet, thence East 236 feet
to the point of beginning.

The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the grantor
at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed
by its duly authorized officers this 1 2 t h
day of
May
A. D., 19 g O ,
Af, ef.
At

/

/

'

,

v.jZ^<*r.^^
r

f

Secretary.

(Corporate Seal)

\ HILLAM ABSTRACTING & INSURANCE AGENCY, INC,
) By
TRUSTEE

\ sZfr *m<ric/y,^
\ .1^&^±.&.J&!^
/

President.

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

Box

Elder

On the
12th
day of
May
, A. D. 1 9 3 0
personally appeared before me C l a r k M. H i l l a m
and
Hannah H i l l a m
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said
C l a r k M« H i l l a m
is the sccretaiv
is the president, and he, the said
Hannah H i l l a m
Trustee
of H i l l a m A b s t r a c t i n g & I n s u r a n c e A g e n c y , I n c / m d that the within and foregoing
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of directors and said
C l a r k M. H i l l a m
and
Hannah H i l l a r a
each*, duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed
is the seal: of said corporation.

.j£:tJ.^.^L;:XS±-!.^
'
My a > m m i s s i o n ^ i r e s . . . . ^ f . . ? / . 3 : ^ . ?

Notary Public.

My residence i s . B p l ? h a m Cit.y,...Utah
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Addendum #3
AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT made on the 14th day of November, 1980, by and between
HERITAGE PARK PLAZA, INC., a Utah Corporation, hereinafter refered to as
VENDORS, and VILLATEK, INC., a Utah Corporation, hereinafter refered to &s
PURCHASERS, of that certain property known as VILLAGE COURT COMMERCIAL
DEVELOPMENT,
WHEREAS, the above Vendors have agreed to sell, and the above Purchasers
have agreed to purchase the aforementioned property, which property is more
particularly described as follows, to-wit:

SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO

WHEREAS, said purchasers have agreed that in order to induce said Vendors
to sell subject property for an amount which has been determined and agreed
upon by both parties herein, they will assume certain responsibilities in
connection with said property.
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of the premises, and
of their mutual promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows:
Purchasers agree to develope a road over the East 66 feet of subject
property, which road shall be approved by the City of Tremonton, prior to
development, and dedicated to same City of Tremonton, following completion
of development, said development to commence on or before June 1, 1981.
Both parties herein, agree that this agreement shall apply to them, their
heirs, successors, and/or assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed by the parties hereto,
on the date set forth above.
"VENDOR"

HERITAGE PARK PLAZA, INC., a Utah Corporation

bv JAMES C. KAI

PRESIDENT

"PURCHASERS" VILLATEK, INC., a Utah Corporation

!L1H. CAHPBfiLLTWBIteff

SCHEDULE A
PART OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10f T U N , R3W, SLB
* H:

BEGINNING AT A POINT ON THE SOUTH LINE OF THE HIGHWAY RIGHTOF-WAY WHICH IS LOCATED S89° 51*47f,W 637.42 FEET ALONG THE
SECTION LINE AND SO0 35'46WW 50*00 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST
CORNER OF THE NORTHWEST ONE QUARTER OF SECTION 10, TllN, R3W
SLB & M; POINT OF BEGINNING ALSO BEING LOCATED N89° 51*47WE
3*00 FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF PLAT R, TREMONTON
CITY SURVEY, THENCE S0° 35'46ffW 292.80 FEET,
THENCE N89°
47'46nE 237.84 FEET, THENCE N0° 26'27WW 292.50 FEET ALONG
AN EXISTING FENCE TO THE SOUTH HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY LINE
THENCE S89° 51'47WW 232,54 FEET ALONG SAID SOUTH LINE TO THE
POINT OF BEGINNING*
CONTAINS 1*58 ACRES
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IKarratttg 8**&
(Corporate Form)
VILLATEK INC.
..corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at
450 East 1000 North, N.S.L. . of County of
Davis
. State of Utah,
trantor, hereby conveys and warrants to Bradley J. Jorgensen, a married man

of S a l t Lake C i t y , County of S a l t Lake, State o f Utah
Ten and NO/100
and o t h e r good and valuable c o n s i d e r a t i o n

the following described tract of land in
State of Utah:
See E x h i b i t

\
i
j
J

Grantee
for the sum of
DOLLARS,

Box Elder

County,

"Aw

The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
tliereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the grantor
at a lawful meeting1 duly held and attended by a quorum.
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed
by its duly authorized officers this 2 5
day of
February
A. D., 19 8 2 ,
;,Attest:
V .* I/,

r,
/'

\

-"TTT:;
f

^^^^\

^(Corporate Seal)
STATE OF UTAH,

^S. *

Cogntyof

Oavis

£I14ATEK INC
Bv''
^

Company

,J^^<(:JL..ZI..:^^.^^,^
/

President

1

J sa.
l

i
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On the
day of
February
.A.D. , 9 8 2
personally appeared before me Russe 11 H Campbe 11
Vaughn R Cook
and
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said
Russe 11 H Campbe 11
is the president, and he, the said Vaughn R Cook
*s * n e secretary
of vi I latek Inc.
Company, and that the within and foregoing
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of direc* tors and said
Russe 11 H Campbe I I
«*<* Vaughn R Cook
each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed
is the seal of said corporation.

.Pai^ii
My Commission expires JO:

'!>(J:>.

.iX&ftLatw?^

}

Notary Public.

JKiy residence is..M..-.l:'A\.'..J.tjJ-1j..Lt.
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Part of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10, T. 11
N., R. 3 W. SLBM. Beginning at a point on the South
line of the Highway right-of-way which is located
South 89051,47" West 637.42 feet along the Section
Line and South OOSSMS" West 50.00 feet from the
Northeast corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section
10, T. 11 N., R. 3 W. SLBfcM; point of beginninq also
being located North 89°51'47H East 3.00 feet from the
Northeast corner of Plat R# Tremonton City Survev,
thence South
0°35*46" West 300.05 feet, thence North
89°47M6 M East 231.06 feet, thence North 299.75 feet
to the South Highway right-of-way line (Point also
being the Northwest corner of the Harris Truck and
Equipment, Inc. property), thence South 89°51*47M
West 227.94 feet along said South Highway right-ofway line to the point of beginning. Contains 1.58
acres.
LESS THE FOLLOWING:
Part of the Northwest quarter of section 10 Township
11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian
more particularly described as follows:
Beginning
at a point which lies South 89°51,47M West 637142
feet along the section line and South 0°35*46w West
50.00 feet from the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of said section 10, Township 11 North,
Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; said point
of beginning lyinq on the South line of highway rightof-way and is also North 89°51'47" East 3.00 feet from
the Northeast corner of Plat R, Tremonton City survey
and running thence South 0°35,46" West 92.94 feet;
thence North 89°51M7" East 161.90 feet; thence North
92.93 feet to said South line of the highway right-ofway, thence South 89°51*47H West along said South line
of highway right-of-way 160.94 feet to the point of
beginning containing 15,000 square feet.
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ADDENDUM 5

Addendum 5
1833J t^w^iNOV 2 81983
Deputy

TRUSTEE'S DEED

^n
oin
BOOK 0/yfAG£^4y
0

I. JOHN L. BESSINGER, Trustee of the hereafter described
real property, state as follows:
WHEREAS. I was appointed as Substitute Trustee on June
3, 1983, of that certain Deed of Trust, dated May 7, 1982,
and recorded on August 2, 1982, in Book 361, Page 73, of the
Official Records of Box Elder County, and
WHEREAS. I caused to be recorded a Notice of Default affecting the hereafter described real property on the 17th day
of June, 1983, in Book 372. Page 762. Recorder #9872AH at the
Box Elder County Recorder's Office, and
WHEREAS, copies of the Notice of Default were delivered
by certified mail to Bradley J. Jorgensen and all other parties
claiming an interest in and to said real property, namely:
Vaughn Cook and Associates, D. Ray Hill and Reid Joseph Hill,
the Internal Revenue Service, and Clint S. Judkins, as Attorney
for the City of Tremonton, and
WHEREAS, I was granted a Power of Sale, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated 57-1-23 and exercised said Power of Sale by
publication of the same in a newspaper having general circulation in the County of Box Elder, State of Utah, once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks, all in accordance with Utah
Code Annotated 57-1-25, and

BOOK

37^250

WHEREAS, I delivered by certified mail a copy of the Notice
of Trustee's Sale to Bradley J. Jorgensen, Vaughn Cook and
Associates, the Internal Revenue Service, D. Ray Hill, Reid
Joseph Hill, and Clint S. Judkins,
WHEREFORE, in accordance with said Notice of Sale, and
pursuant to Title 57-1-28 of the Utah Code Annotated, the following described real property was sold, assigned and conveyed
to Golden Spike State Bank, at public auction, as highest bidder
for the sum of $20,000.00, lawful money of the United States,
which said sum includes the principal amount due and owing
Golden Spike State Bank, plus interest, costs and attorney's
fees incurred in selling the real property; that said sale
was conducted on the 2nd day of November, 1983, at the hour
of 10:30 a.m., at the door of the Box Elder County Courthouse,
located in Brigham City, Utah; that no other bids were received
for purchase of the real property, more particularly described
as follows:
"Part of the Northwest quarter of Section 10,
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, more particularly described as
follows: Beginning at a point which lies South
89°51'A7" West along a section line 637.A2 feet
and South 0°35'A6" West 1A2.9A feet from the
Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of
said Section 10, Township 11 North, Range 3
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; said point
of beginning lying South 0°35'A6M West 92.9A
feet from a point which lies on the South line
of highway right-of-way and running thence South
0°35'A6" West 207-11 feet; thence North 89°A7'A6"
East 16A.06 feet; thence North 206.90 feet thence
South 89°51'A7" West 161.90 feet to the point of
beginning, containing 0.77A AC."

-2-

379^251
WHEREFORE, this Deed n o w conveys to GOLDEN SPIKE STATE
BANK, without right of redemption, all of my title, interest
and estate in and to said real property, as well as all of
the rights, title, interest and claims of BRADLEY J. JORGENSEN,
as Trustor, his successors in interest and all other persons
claiming by, through or under him in and to the above described
real property, including all such right, title, interest and
claim in and to such property acquired by BRADLEY J. JORGENSEN,
as Trustor, or his successor in interest, subsequent to the
execution of the Trust Deed mentioned above.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign this Deed as Trustee and Grantor
this

/ d a y of

/

Y

^

^ ^1983.

John L. Bessinger, Trustee w"~
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before m e this

Da

7j Itr-^-J^

//

day of

, 1983.

My Commission Expires:
'..:,., • • f ? - 3-7>~ %'L

5TO^

Q-

Notary Public
Residing at Treraonton, Utah

V* . , \ ; ;
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED
{ C o r p o r a t e Form]

Federal Deposit Insurance
Golden S p i k e S t a t e Bank

Corporation

as

Liquidator

of

, a corporation
o r g a n i z e d and e x i s t i n g under t h e l a w s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , w i t h i t s p r i n c i p a l
o f f i c e i n W a s h i n g t o n D . C . , G r a n t o r h e r e b y QUIT CLAIMS t o

James Holmgren
Grantee
f o r t h e sum o f
DOLLARS,

of
TEN AND NO/100

•;—-r
-.
3
:—rr
and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e

the f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d t r a c t of land i n

***See a t t a c h e d E x h i b i t

Dated

this

8 th

7^
ZT
considerations
Box E l d e r

County,

A***

day o f

November

1991

7EDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

as Liquidator of Golden Spike State
Bank .
~ . .,.
BY:

STATE Of CAUFOFlNU
COUNTY Of OfJANGE
On**s

~±*1

oayot

Nov-

a notary puohc personalty.

« •w ye;' 19 $±
Edward Kato

Judy C. Ruiz
personaty known 10. me (0/ proved

At t o r n e y - 1 n - f a c t

to me ontoebasis of satisfactory e

b« ine person wno executed this instrument as

of " x Federal Oeoos* insurance Corpora*

:f OCi and acknowledged to me mat the FOtC eaecuted 4.

y evidence)
E Marketing
i to me that

S_x\
(This area (or notary n i l i i i i i i * » l

eoot 51(W 51
EXHIBIT A

The land referred to herein is situate in the State of Uti-h, County
of Box Elder and is described as follows:
PARCEL 1: (05-060-0(41) Part of the Northwest Quarter of Section
\
10, Township 11 North, Range 3 Vest, SLM, more particularly described
as follows: Beginning at a point which lies South 89°51*47«'
West along a Section Line €37,42 feet and South 0°35M6 , < Vest
142.94 feet from the Northeast Corner of the Northwest Quarter of
said Section 10, Township 11 North, Range 3 We£t, SLM; said point of
beginning lying South 0°35,46,< West 92.94 feet from a point
which lies on the South line of Highway right of way and running
thence South 0<)35,46,« West 207.11 feet; thence North
89°47<46" E a s t 164.06 feet; thence North 206.90 feet; thence
South 89051*47,* West 161.90 feet to the point of beginning.
PARCEL 2: (05-060-0038) Beginning at a point which lies South
89°51*47••
West 476.48 feet along the Section line and South
0°35*A6t9
West 50 feet from the Northeast Corner of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North, Range 3 West,
SLM., said point of beginning lying on the South line of State
Highway right of way and is also North 89°51*47*' East 163.94
from the Northeast Corner
of Plat R, TREMONTON CITY Survey, running
thence South O ^ S ^ e * 1 West 299.83 feet; thence North
89°47'46" East 67 feet; thence North 299.75 feet to State
Highway right of way line (said point also being the Northwest
Corner of the Harris Truck and Equipment Inc. property); thence
South 89°51*47•• West 67 feet along State Highway right of way
line to the point of beginning.
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05-060-0038
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CARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C. BYWATER, his wife as joint tenants and not
as tenants in common, with full rights of survivorship,
83 South Main
„ranues of Brighare C i t y
KK 1.1 u.jof
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHhR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION
the following described if act
of lai.d m
Box Elder
Count) Mate of Utah
PARCEL 1:
05-060-0041
Fart of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North, Range
3 West, Salt Lake Meridian
BEGINNING at a point which lies South 89*51*47" West along a Section
Line 637.42 feet and South 0*35*46" West 142.94 feet from the
Northeast Corner of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 10,
Township 11 North, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian; said point of
beginning lying South 0*35'46" West 92.94 feet from a point which
lies on the South line of Highway right of way and running thence
South 0*35*46" West 207.11 feet; thence North 89*47*46" East 164.06
feet; thence North 206.90 feet; thence South 89*51*47" West 161.90
feet to the point of BEGINNING.
PARCEL 2: 05-060-0038
BEGINNING at a point which lies South 89*51 , 47" West 476.48 feet along
the Section line and South 0*35*46" West 50 feet from the Northeast
Corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North,
Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, said point of beginning lying on
the South line of State Highway right of way and is also North
89*51*47" East 163.94 feet from the Northeast Corner of Plat R,
Tremonton City Survey, running thence South 0*35*46" West 299.83
feet; thence North 89*47*46" East 67 feet; thence North 299.75 feet
to State Highway right of way line (said point also being the
Northwest Corner of the Harris Truck and Equipment Inc. property),
thence South 89*51*47" West 67 feet along State Highway right of way
line to the point of BEGINNING.
PARCEL 3/ 05-136-0069
Lot 25, Block 8, PARK MEADOWS SUBDIVISION, Plat B, according to the
official plat thereof.

4th

WITNESS the hand of said grantor

day of

I ( V 'James Holmgren

signed in the presence of

19 93

/

RECORDING DATA

STATE OF UTAH
Entr> No.

is

County of Box Elder
On the
4th
da> of June
AD !"• 93 persooali) appeared before iTie
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ADDENDUM 8

Addendum b

WARRANTY DEED
GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C. BYWATER
grantor

of

Brigham C i t y

County of

B o x E ider

S l a t e of Utah, hereby CONVEY and WARRANT t o

DEAN R. POTTER and DIANE B. POTTER, his wife as joint tenants
and not as tenants in common, with full rights of survivorship,

965 South Main
grantees of Garland
tor the sum of
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER VALUABLE CONSIDERATION
the following described tract
of land in
Box Elder

BOOK
County. State of Utah:

Tax Number: ^05-060-0038'
>i~. 06,0 *o£Sf*fa**~^-*^
BEGINNING at a point which lies South 89°51 , 47" West 476.48 feet along
the Section line and South 0°35 , 46 M West 50 feet from the Northeast
Corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North, Range
3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, said point of beginning lying on the South
line of State Highway right of way and is also North 89°51'47" East
163.94 feet from the Northeast Corner of Plat R, Tremonton City Survey,
running thence South 0°35 , 46" West 178.00 feet; thence North 89°47 , 46"
East 67 feet; thence North 178.00 feet to State Highway right of way
line (said point also being the Northwest Corner of the Harris Truck
and Equipment Inc. property); thence South 89°51 , 47" West 67 feet along
State Highway right of way line to the point of BEGINNING.
Reserving to the grantor a right of way for ingress and egress over
the West 20 feet.

WITNESS, the hand of said grantors . this

23rd

Signed in the presence of

day of

July

A.D.

19 9 3

cMh\

STATE OF UTAH

RECORDING DATA
Fee $

Entry N o .

_
. of
^r
S U A E l d eTr
County
On the
23rd
day of
July
A.D. 19 9 3 personally appeared before me
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GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C. BYWATER
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Notary Public

Commission expires;
Residing in
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POLICY OF T I M INSURANCE
40
ISSUED BY

First American Title Insurance Company

SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS FROM COVERAGE CONTAINED IN
SCHEDULE B AND THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS, FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a
California corporation, herein called the Company, insure^ as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A against loss or
damage, not exceeding the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A, sustained or incurred by the insured by
reason of.
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested other than as stated therein;
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on the title;
3. Unmarketabiiity of the title;
4. Lack of a right of access to and from the land.
The Company will also pay the costs, attorneys1 fees and expenses incurred in defense of the title, as insured, but only to
the extent provided in the Conditions and Stipulations.

First American Titk Insurance Company
BY

H

826523

/jW^J&

ATTEST WJ c

^ ^**r£~/L.

PRESfDENT

SECRETARY

EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE
The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy and the Company will not pay loss or damage, costs, attorneys' fees or
expenses which arise by reason of.
1.

(a) Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning laws, ordinances, or regulations) restricting
regulating, prohibiting or relating to (Q the occupancy, use, or enjoyment of the land; (if) the character, dimensions or location of any improvement
now or hereafter erected on the lan6; (BQ a separationtoownership orachange Intoed i m e n ^ ^
is or was a part; or (rv) environmental protection, or the effect of any violation of these laws, ordinances or governmental regulations, except to the
extent that a notice of the enforcement thereof or a notice of a defect lien or encumbrance resulting from a violation or alleged violation affecting
the land has been recorded in the public records at Date of Policy,
(b) Any governmental police power not excluded by (a) above, except to the extent that a notice of the exercise thereof or a notice of a defect, lien or
encumbrance resulting from a violation or alleged violation affecting the land has been recorded in the public records at Oate of Policy.

2.

Rights of eminent domain unless notice of the exercise thereof has been recorded in the public records at Oate of Policy, but not excluding from
coverage any taking which has occurred pnor to Oate of Policy which would be binding on the rights of a purchaser for value without
knowledge.

3

Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters
(a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant,
(b) not knownto the Company, not recorded in the public records at Date of Policy, but known to the insured claimant and not disclosed in writing to
the Company by the insured claimant prior to the date the insured claimant became an insured under this policy,
(c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant,
(d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy, or
(e) resulting in loss or damage which would not have been sustained if the insured claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured
by this policy

4

Any claim, which anses out of the transaction vesting in the insured the estate or interest insured by this policy, by reason of the operation of federal
bankruptcy, state insolvency, or similar creditors' rights laws

CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS
1 . DEFINITION OF TERMS
The following terms when used in this policy mean.
(a) "insured" the Insured named in Schedule A, and,
subject to any rights or defenses the Company would have had
against the named insured, those who succeed to the interest
of the named insured by operation of law as distinguished from
purchase Including, but not limited to, heirs distributees,
devisees, survivors, personal representatives next of kin, or
corporate or fiduciary successors
(b) -insured claimant" an insured claiming loss or
damage.
(c) "knowledge" or "known"* actual knowledge, not
constructive knowledge or notice which may be imputed to an
insured by reason of the public records as defined in this policy
or any other records which impart constructive notice of mat
ters affecting the land.
(d) "land" the land described or referred to in Schedule
(A), and improvements affixed thereto which by law constitute
real property The term "land" does not include any property
beyond the lines of the area described or referred to in
Schedule (A), nor any right title, interest, estate or easement
m abutting streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or
waterways, but nothing herein shall modify or limit the extent
to which a right of access to and from the land is insured by
this policy
(e) "mortgage"* mortgage. 6ee6 of trust, trust deed or
other security instrument
(f) "public records" records established under state
statutes at Oate of Policy for the purpose of imparting constructive notice of matters relating to real property to pur
chasers for value and without knowledge With respect lo
Section 1(a)0v) of the Exclusions From Coverage "public
records"* shall also include environmental protection liens fried
in the records of the clerk of the United States district court for
the district in which the land is located
(g) "unmarketabttity of the title" an alleged or apparent
matter affecting the title to the land, not excluded or excepted
froma)mage,wWchwouWenWlearxjrcriaseroftheestateor
interest described In Schedule A to be released from the
obligation to purchase by virtue of a contractual condition
requiring tbe ddrvery«of marketable title.
2. CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE AFTER
mUVFYAMfTOr-TITIF

the basis of loss or damage and shall state, to the extent possi
ble, the basis of calculating the amount of the loss or damage
If the Company is prejudiced by the failure of the insured
claimant to provide the required proof of loss or damage, the
Company's obligations to the insured under the policy shall
terminate, including any liability or obligation to defend, pros
ecute, or continue any litigation, with regard to the matter or
matters requiring such proof of loss or damage
In addition, the insured claimant may reasonably be required to submit to examination under oath by any authorized
representative of the Company and shall produce for examina
tion, inspection and copying at such reasonable times and
places as may be designated by any authorized representative
of the Company, all records, books ledgers, checks, correspondence and memoranda, whether bearing a date before or
after Oate of Policy, which reasonably pertain to the loss or
damage. Further if requested by any authorized representa
uve of the Company, the insured claimant shall grant its per
mission, in writing, for any authorized representative of the
Company to examine, inspect and copy all records, books
ledgers, checks, correspondence and memoranda in the cus
tody or control of a third party, which reasonably pertain to the
loss or damage. All information designated as confidential by
the insured claimant provided to the Company pursuant to this
Section shall not be disclosed to others unless, in the reasonable judgment of the Company, It is necessary in the adrmms
tratwn of the daim. Failure of the insured claimant to submit
f a examination under oath, produce other reasonably request
ed information or grant permission to secure reasonably
necessary information from third parties as required in this
paragraph, unless prohibited by law or governmental regula
tion, shall terminate any liability o1 the Company under this
policy as to that claim
6 OPTIONS TO PAY OR OTHERWISE SETTLE CLAIMS.
TERMINATION OF LIABILITY
In case of a claim under this policy, the Companv shall have
the following additional options:
(a) To Pay or Tender Payment of the Amount of
Insurance,
Topayortende* J . _
"t** the amount of Insurance
under this poTicy together wrth any tosts, attorneys' fees and
expenses Incurred by the insured claimant, which were

(b) In the event of any litigation, including litigation by
the Company or with the Company's consent, the Company
shall have no liability for loss or damage until there has been
a final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction,
and disposition of all appeals therefrom, adverse to trie titlr
as insured
(c) The(>)mparystennotbeliableforlossordamageto
any insured for liability voluntarily assumed by the insured
in settling any claim or suit without the prior written consent
of the Company
10 REDUCTION OF INSURANCE, REDUCTION OR
TERMINATION OF LIABILITY
All payments under this policy except payments mad*1
for costs attorneys* fees and expenses, shall reduce th
amount of the insurance pro tanto
11 LIABILITY NONCUMULATIVL
It is expressly understood that the amount of insurance
under this policy shall be reduced by any amount the Com
pany may pay under any policy insuring a mortgage to whicf
exception is taken m Schedule B or to which the insured ha
agreed, assumed, or taken subject, or which is hereafte
executed by an insured and which is a charge orfienon th
estate or interest described or referred to in Schedule A, arv
the amount so paid shall be deemed a payment under thi
policy to the insured owner
12 PAYMENT OF LOSS
(a) No payment shall be made without producing thi
policy for endorsement of the payment unless the oofcey ha
beentostor destroyed, m which case proof of loss or destruc
tion shall be furnished to the satisfaction ol the Compam
(b) When liability and the extent of loss or damag
has been definitely fixed in accordance with these Condition
and Stipulations, thetossor damage shall be payable with?
30 days thereafter
13. SUBROGATION UPON PAYMENT
OR SETTLEMENT.
(a) The Company's RlgMT* Sobrog^w
Whenever the Company shall have settled arrtpaW
Halm unoW thk rWirv all nnht nf Pronation shan vest

lOf canccttduuu
insured in any transfer or conveyance c
jki.t
(b) ToPayorOtherwiseSetttoWmtPartiesOtherthan
TWs policy snail not continue in force in favor of any purchaser
insured c.„
from the insured of either (0 an estate or interest in the (and, or the Insured or With the Insured ClaimanL
ffl topayorottierwisesetttewithotherpartiesftforpromise o r j ™ ^ ,
(ft) an indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage
in the name of an insured claimant any claim Insured against
given to the insured.
under this policy,togetherwith any costs, 8 0 0 0 1 ^ fees and
expenses incurred by the insured claimant which were
3. NOTICE Of CLAIM TO BE GIVEN BY
authorized by the Company up to the time of payment and
INSURED CLAIMANT.
The insured shad notify the Company prornptlyfo writing® which the Company is obligated to pay, or
(IQ to pay or otherwise settle with the insured claimkiwseofanylru^tk)nassetforthlnSection4(a)bek)wX^w
ant the loss or damage providedforunder this poficy, tooether
case knowledge shall come to an insured hereunder otany
with
any
costs, attorneys'feesand expenses tacurredoythe IftossshoOW tesutt from any act of trie Insured c&kiiant
claim of title or interest which is adverse to the title to the
insured claimant which were authorized by theConipanyupto
estate or interest, as insured, and which might causetossor the time of payment and which the Company is obligated
damage for which the Company may be liable by virtue of this to pay.
part of any losseslnsured against by this W ? w M shall
policy, or (Kl) if title to the estate or interest, as insured, is
Upon the exercise by the Company of either of the options e x c ^ t £ a m o w U a n y , l ^
rejected as unmarketable. If prompt notice shall not be grvento providedforin paragraphs (b)(i) or (ii), the Compan/s obfi- ^impairment by the insured claimant of the Company's
H
the Company, then as to the insured allfiabultyof the Com- gattons to the insured under this policy for the claimedtossor right of subrogation.
^J
pany shall terminate with regard to the matter or matters for damage, other than the payments required to be made, shall
(b) The Company's Rights Against non-insured
which prompt notice is required; provided, however, that
terminate, including any liability or obligation to defend, pros- Obligors.
failure to notify the Company shall in no case prejudice the
Tta[Gompamfc right of subrogation against nooecute or continue any Gtigatioa
rights of any insured under this policy unless the Company
insured obligors shall exist and Shan indude, without limitashad be prejudiced by the failure and then only to the extent of7. DETERMINATION, EXTENT OF LIABILITY
tion, the rights of the insured to indemnities, guaranties,
the prejudice.
other policies of insurance or bonds, notwithstanding any
AND COINSURANCE
terms or conditions contained in those instruments which
This policy is a contract of indemnity against actual
4. OEFENSEANO PROSECUTION OF ACTIONS;
provide for subrogationrightsby reason of this policy.
monetary
toss
or
damage
sustained
or
incurred
by
the
insured
DUTY OF INSURED CLAIMANT TO COOPERATE
claimant who has sufferedtossor damage by reason of mat- 14. ARBITRATION.
(a) Upon written request by the insured and subject to ters insured against by this poficy and only to the extent herein
the options contained in Section 6 of these Conditions and described.
Unless prohibited by applicable law, either the Company
Stipulations, the Company, at its own cost and without unrea(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall or the insured may demand arbitration pursuant to the Title
sonable delay, shall provide for the defense of an insured in not exceed the least ot
Insurance Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
litigation in which any third party asserts a daim adverse to
fi) the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A; or, Association Arbitrable matters may include, but are no'
the title or interest as insured, but only as to those stated
limited
to, any controversy or daim between the Company
(ii) the difference between the value of the insured
causes of action alleging a defect, lien or encumbrance or other estate or interest as insured and the value of the insured
and the insured arising out of or relating to this policy, an\
matter insured against by this policy. The Company shall have estate or interest subject to the defect, lien or encumbrance service of the Company in connection with its issuance o
the right to select counsel of its choice (subject to therightof insured against by this policy.
the breach of a policy provision or other obligation. Al
the insured to object for reasonable cause) to represent the
arbitrable matters when the Amount of Insurance i*
(b) In the event the Amount of Insurance stated in
insured as to those stated causes of action and shall not be Schedule A at the Oate of Policy is less than 80 percent of the $1.000.000 or less shall be arbitrated at the option of eithe
liable for and will not pay the fees of any other counsel The value of the insured estate or interest or the full consideration the Company o( the insured. All arbitrable matters when ttv
Company will not pay any fees, costs or expenses incurred by paid for the land, whichever is less, or if subsequent to the OateAmount of Insurance is in excess of $1,000,000 shall b
the insured hi the defense of those causes of action which of Policy an improvement is erected on the land which in- arbitrated only when agreed to by both the Company and th
allege matters not insured against by this policy.
creases the value of the insured estate or interest by at least insured Arbitration pursuant to this policy and under th
(b) The Company shall have the right, at its own cost, to 20 percent over the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A, Rules in effect on the date the demand for arbitration is mad
institute and prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any then this Policy is subject to the following:
or, at the option of the insured, the Rules in effect at Oate c
other act which in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to
Policy shall be binding upon the parties. The award ma
(0 where no subsequent improvement has been
establish the title to the estate or interest, as insured, or to pre- made, as to any partialtoss,the Company shall only pay the include attorneys* fees onlyftthe laws of the state in whic
vent or reducetossor damaae to the insured. The Company toss proratain the proportion that the amount of insurance atthe land is located permit a court to award attorneys' fees t
may take any appropriate action under the terms of this poficy, Date of Poficy bears to the total value of the insured estate or a prevailing party. Judgment upon the award rendered by th
whether or not it shall be liable hereunder, and shall not
Arbitrators) may be entered in any court having juris
interest at Date of Policy; or (ii) where a subsequent
thereby concede liability or waive any provision of this poficy. improvement has been made, as to any partial loss, the Com- diction thereof.
If the Company shall exercise its rights under this paragraph, pany shall only pay the loss pro rata in the proportion that 120 The law of the situs of the land shall apply to an arbitratic
it shall do so diligently.
percent of the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A bears under the Title Insurance Arbitration Rules.
(c) Whenever the Company shall have brought an
to the sum of the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A and A copy of the Rules may be obtained from the Compar
action or interposed a defense as required or permitted by the the amount expended for the improvement
upon request
provisions of this policy, the Company may pursue any litigaThe provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to costs,
tion to final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction attorneys' fees and expenses for which the Company is liable 15. LIABILITY LIMITED TO THIS POLICY;
and expressly reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to
POLICY ENTIRE CONTRACT.
under this policy, and shall only apply to that portion of any
appeal from any adverse judgment or order.
toss which exceeds, in the aggregate, 10 percent of the
(a) This policy together with all endorsements, if an
(d) In all cases where this policy permits or requires the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A.
attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy and co
Company to prosecute or provide for the defense of any action
(c) The Company will pay only thosecosts, attorneys' feestract between the insured and the Company In interpret
or proceeding, the insured shall secure to the Company the and expenses incurred in accordance with Section 4 of these
any provision of this policy, this policy shall be construed.
right to so prosecute or provide defense in the action or pro- Conditions and Stipulations.
a whole
ceeding, arid all appeals therein, and permit the Company to
(bj Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not basi
use, at its option, the name of the insured for this purpose. 8. APPORTIONMENT.
on negligence, and which arises out of the status of the tit
Whenever requested by the Company, the insured, at the Comto
the
estate or interest covered hereby or by any action a
(f the land described in Schedule (A)(C) consists of two or
pany's expense, shall give the Company all reasonable aid (i)
m any action or proceedirta. securing evidence, obtaining wit- more parcels which are not used as a single site, and a loss isserting such daim, shall be restricted to this policy.
(c) No amendment of or endorsement to this poll
nesses, prosecuting or defending the action or proceeding, or established affecting one or more of the parcels but not all, the
can be made except by a writing endorsed hereon
effecting settlement, and (ii) in any other lawful act which in toss shall be computed and settled on a pro rata basis as if the
the opinion of the Company may be necessary or desirable to amount of insurance under this policy was divided pro rata as attached hereto signed by either the President a Vice Pre
to the value on Oate of Policy of each separate parcel to the dent the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or vafidati
establish the title to the estate or interest as insured. If the
Company is prejudiced by the failure of the insured to furnish whole, exclusive of any improvements made subsequent to officer or authorized signatory of the Company.
Oate of Policy, unless a liability or value has otherwise been
the required cooperation, the Company's obligations to the
insured under the policy shall terminate, including any liability agreed upon as to each parcel by the Company and the insured16. SEVERABILITY.
or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation, at the time of the issuance of this policy and shown by an ex- In the event any provision of the policy is held invalid
with regard to the matter a matters requiring such cooperation. press statement or by an endorsement attached to this poficy. unenforceable under applicable law, the policy shall
deemed not to indude that provision and all other provisic
9. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.
shall remain in full force and effect
5. PROOF OF LOSS OR OAMAGE.
(a) If the Company establishes the title, or removes the
In addition to and after the notices required under Section 3
of these Conditions and Stipulations have been provided the alleged delect lien or encumbrance, or cures the lack ot a right 17. NOTICES, WHERE SENT.
Company, a proof oftossor damage signed and sworn to by the of access to or from the land, or cures the claim of unmarket- All notices required to be given the Company and i
insured claimant shall be furnished to the Company within 90 ability of title, all as insured, in a reasonably diligent manner by statement in writing required to be furnished the Compj
shall include the number of this policy and shall
days after the insured claimant shall ascertain the facts giving any method, including litigation and the completion of any
rise to thetossor damage. The proof oftossor damage shall appeals therefrom, it shall have fully performed its obligations addressed to the Company at 114 East Fifth Street Sa
with
respect
to
that
matter
and
shall
not
be
liable
for
any
toss
Ana, California 92701, or to the office which issued t
describe the defect in, or lien or encumbrance on the title, or
other matter insured against by this policy which constitutes or damage caused thereby
policy.

SCHEDULE A
Total fee for Title Search, Examination
and Title Insurance

$200.00

Amount of Insurance: $15,000.00

Policy No. 14549-15

Date of Policy: 07/29/93 6 4*14 P.M.

Order No. H-47763

1. Name of Insured:
DEAN R. POTTER and DIANE B. POTTER

2. The estate or interest in the land which is covered by the policy is:
FEE SIMPLE

3. The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in:
DEAN R. POTTER AND DIANE B. POTTER, his wife
as joint tenants and not as tenants in common, with full rights of
survivorship.

4. The land referred to in this policy is situated in the County of Box Elder,
State of Utah, and is described as follows:
05-060-0038

BEGINNING at a point which lies South 89*51*47** West 476.48 feet along
the Section line and South 0*35*46" West 50 feet from the Northeast
Corner of the Northwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North, Range
3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, said point of beginning lying on the South
line of State Highway right of way and is also North 89*51*47" East
163.94 feet from the Northeast Corner of Plat R, Tremonton City Survey,
running thence South 0*35'46** West 178.00 feet; thence North 89*47*46"
East 67 feet; thence North 178.00 feet to State Highway right of way
line (said point also being the Northwest Corner of the Harris Truck and
Equipment Inc. property); thence South 89*51*47** West 67 feet along
State Highway right of way line to the point of BEGINNING.
Reserving to the grantor a right of way for ingress and egress over the
West 20 feet.

SCHEDULE B

14549-15

This policy does not Insure against loss by reason of the matters shown in parts
one and two following:
1. Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that levies taxes or assessmer
property or by the public records.
2. Any facts, rights, interest, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained by an inspect!(
land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof.
3. Easements, claims of easements, or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records.
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments or any other facts which a correct survey would dii
which are not shown by the public records.
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in acts authorizing the issuance thereof, water rights, clalt
to water.
6. Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material heretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law and not si
public records.
Part T w o ;

1. Taxes for the year 1993 which are liens, but not yet due or payable.
Taxes include the following:
BOX ELDER COUNTY,
BOX ELDER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRCT, and
BEAR RIVER WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRCT.
Serial No. 05-060-0038.
2. The described property is found within the corporate limits of Tremonton and is
subject to all charges and assessments levied thereby. (Assessed with taxes)
3. The described property is found within the boundaries of the
Tremonton-Garland Drainage District and is subject to all assessments
levied thereby. (Assessed with taxes)
4. Subject to easement for pole lines and irrigation ditches as now
existing over and across the property described herein.
5. Subject to the reservation of all oil, gas and mineral rights.
6. Subject to a right of way easement granted by Floyd Chadaz to
Treraonton-Garland Drainage District recorded October 17, 1972 as Entry
No. 32602H in Book 244 page 356 of the official records granting an
easement over the following: COM at a pt 264 ft S of NE Cor of N-l/2 of
NW- 1/4 of Sec 10, T U N , R3W, SLM, th S 1056 ft; th W 660 ft; th N 1287
ft; th E 250 ft; th S 231 ft; th E 410 ft to BEG. ALSO: BEG at the SE
Cor of the NW-1/4 of Sec 10, T11N, R 3 W, SLM, th W 650 ft, m/1, th N
1320 ft; th E 650 ft; th S 1320 ft to pt of BEG.
7. Subject to a ditch easement over the West 4 feet of the herein described
property described and granted by instrument recorded March 17, 1981 as
Entry No. 84037H in Book 343, Page 4 of the official records.
8. Subject to an Agreement granted by J. L. Carter for Tremonton Garland
Drainage District granting permanent construction rights above the
underground drain line easement description as Item 6 above, said
instrument recorded April 21, 1983 as Entry No. 97502H in Book 370, page
153 of the official records.

/=

ADDENDUM 1 0

Addendum 10

Marlin J. Grant (#4581)
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84323-0525
Telephone (801) 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH# IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
DEAN R. POTTER and
DIANE B. POTTER, d/b/a
DEAN'S SUPER LUBE

AFFIDAVIT OF
DEAN R. POTTER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RETA CHADAZ (Party who claims
66 foot Right-of-way);
GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN C.
BYWATER (On Warranty Deed);
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INS. CO.
(On Title Policy);
Civil No. 960000272
and JOHN DOES 1-10, who may
claim interest in said
Right-of-way.
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Box Elder
•USON 8c H O G G A N . P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
8 8 WEST CENTER
P.O. BOX 5 2 5

LOGAN. UTAH 84323-0525
<801)752-1551
TREMONTON OFFICE:
1 2 3 EAST MAIN
P.O. BOX 1 15

)
: ss.
)

DEAN R. POTTER, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and
states as follows:
1.
I am competent to testify in this matter and am
personally familiar with the facts of this case.
2.
Prior to the purchase of the property in question, I
physically inspected the property. Upon physical inspection, I

TREMONTON. UTAH 6 4 3 3 7

(801)257-3885

m

learned that the property dropped sharply off of Main Street and it
was impossible for anyone to drive off of the curb from Main Street
without high centering or dropping so sharp into the terrain as to
make it impassable.

Also, at the South end of the property a ditch

runs East and West making it impossible to cross said property with
vehicular traffic.

I discovered that there had never been any use

of the property for any right-of-way or roadways.
3.

Defendant Reta Chadaz claims that this right-of-way has

been used as access to take farm machinery and equipment to and
from Reta Chadaz property when the property had been farmed.

I

clearly deny this allegation based on the physical inspection,
since the obstructions across the property would have made it
impossible to take farm machinery or equipment through this 66 foot
wide section and I am not aware of Defendant ever taking equipment
across this property.
4.
by me.

Defendant Reta Chadaz also denies she ever was contacted
However, I affirmatively state that I called Reta Chadaz,

as well as all other surrounding owners, including Fronk Chevrolet,
Lucky's

Restaurant,

Mrs. Johnny

Chadaz,

and Bill

Hatchf and

indicated to all of them that I was going to build on the property
and

apply

for a building

permit,

and that

if they

had any

objections whatsoever to this construction of a building across
said property, that they should appear at the zoning meeting to
object.

(See copy

objections.)

of

zoning

meeting

minutes

showing

no

Defendant Reta Chadaz stated by phone that it would

make no difference anyway and failed to tell me that she claimed
any right-of-way across the property.
5.
:>LSON & H O G G A N

PC

ATTORNEYS AT tAW
8 8 WEST CENTER
P O BOX 5 2 5

I specifically state that Maurice Staples never had a

discussion with me until after I had already fully constructed all
of the improvements on the property.
I had purchased the property.

This was several years after

The date when Notice of Bona Fide

LOGAN UTAH 8 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5
<801)752 1551

TREMONTON OFFICE
1 2 3 EAST MAIN
PO

BOX 1 1 5

TREMONTON UTAH 8 4 3 3 7

purchaser status is to be construed is primarily on the date of
purchase.
informed

I admit that I talked to Maurice Staples and was finally
that

someone

was claiming

a right-of-way

across my

property, but not until April of 1995, and I immediately went to

(801) 257 3885

) &

>LSON «c H O G G A N . P C .
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
8 8 WEST CENTER
P.O. BOX 5 2 5
COG AN. UTAH 8 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5
<8011752-1551

TREMONTON OFFICE.
1 2 3 CAST MAIN
P.O. BOX 1 1 5
TREMONTON. UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
(801)257-3885

see my attorney on April 28, 1995, which was clearly after I had
already constructed all of my improvements on the property. Both
Reta Chadaz and Maurice Staples are totally in error to state that
I had notice of the right-of-way prior to purchase or prior to
building those improvements.
6.
Reta Chadaz has had several opportunities to tell me of
her claim of right-of-way and has never made said claim until after
April of 1995.
7.
I conducted a diligent search and inquiry into the
property to make sure that it was free and clear. My bank insisted
that before I build on the property that the property would have to
be free of encumbrances.
We conducted a title search which
revealed that there were no encumbrances on the property and all
the Deeds from Villatek forward reflect no evidence of any rightof-way, several of which are granted by Warranty Deed.
My
immediate Seller, Gary Bywater, did not indicate that there was any
right-of-ways across the property and no physical inspection
revealed any right of way.
When I personally contacted Reta
Chadaz, she did not inform me of any right-of-way and no claim of
right-of-way has ever been made by her prior to my purchase or
while I was making improvements to my property.
8.
Reta Chadaz has several other access routes to her
property including 100 South, 200 South, 400 South, 600 South and
other City streets besides using my property. Those access routes
are just as good, if not better, and are already built into the
City's master plan for roadways.
9.
It seems totally unjust to harm an innocent purchaser,
such as myself, when the party who could have stopped all of this
failed to act. Reta Chadaz will not be harmed by taking alternative
routes to her property whereas I will be severely damaged if a
right-of-way is taken across the property I propose to expand my
building on and where I have already made substantial improvements.
The improvements made on the 66 foot piece of property in question
cost me over $15,000.00 and include $8,257.00 on driveway
improvements (see Misrasi Concrete bill); and about $7,000.00 on

ibi

gravel fill, cement walls, lawn and sprinkler and other landscapinq
improvements• I currently cannot improve my property further or
obtain any other loans against my property until this right-of-way
problem is cleared.
10. I respectfully request the Court to rule the right-of-way
to be abandoned, terminated and Reta Chadaz equitably estopped and
to treat me as a bona fide purchaser for value taking the property
free of said claim.
DATED this

^ / V ^ d a y of December, 1996.

AY^O-ns^
ts^y^t££^^>
Dean R. Potter

DEAN R. POTTER, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and
says:

That

he

has

read

the

foregoing

Affidavit,

knows

and

i

understands the contents thereof, and that the same are true of his
own knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information and
belief; and as to such matters, he believes them to be true.

Dean R. Potter

r)^)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
1996.
O L S O N 8c H O G G A N , P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
ee WEST CENTER
P.O. B O X 5 2 5
LOGAN. U T A H 84323-052S
(801)752-1551

TREMONTON

IE8UE MORRISON

A^

n±

v/:fr/ / r
NOT^kY PUBLIC

day of December,

J u

V-OfK-

•35HO2300W
TOGMONTOlUTKar

COMM. EXP, 11-22-2000

OFFICE

1 2 3 EAST MAIN
P.O. BOX 1 15
TREMONTON. UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
<801> 2 5 7 - 3 8 8 5
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ADDENDUM 1 1

FEES:
BASE FEE:
$10.00
MAILING COSTS
RECEIPT NUMBER 3077
DATE PAID
/,2-/-<73

V.UWilXXJLUWiiX- «•="-

*

Addendum 11
ZONING REVIEW
(LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE CHAPTER 7-7)

CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT NO,
BUILDING PERMIT NO. (IF APPLICABLE).
PROJECT REQUESTED:

f% Lx.

DATE OF APPLICATION:

12M \^ 3

REPRESENTED BY:

L\J&>J>

C?wrW

DATE OF MEETING:

X>* gr^ Vk ^V
Li)jp^

LOCATION OF REQUEST:
f\

ACTION REQUESTED:

CL^-<L

£J*

\l(l

K_?

PHONE: 0<C1

Z/r7(f

/^A*^

I A.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:

LIST ALL PROPERTY OWNERS THAT ARE WITHIN A 300 FOOT RADIUS OF THE
PROPOSED LOCATION REQUESTING THE CONDITIONAL USE PERMITNAME

PHONE

ADDRESS
'SoS'

uJ

>»t4-j»L.

.r<to
^4.1*
UJ
if* US A/ {*Bo0 u)
^rtjr
U> >M*J«\.
SSA UJ. ?rf A_I'-U

<2^7~3

oof

as0?' o ^ ?^r

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE NOTIFIED THOSE LISTED ABOVE OF THE DATE AND
TIME OF THE MEETING WHERE MY APPLICATION WILL BE DISCUSSED- I
UNDERSTAND THAT I AM SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY REPERCUSSIONS AS A
RESULT OF MY FAILURE TO MAKE SAID NOTIFICATIONS.
SIGNED:

/U^c^^

PLANNING COMMISSION

^y^^z
APPROVAL : H&^& Sr&rZ^

PLANNING COMMISSION CHAIRMAN

CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT GRANTED (DATE) :

<^«

-?

/?*?

COMMENTS IN ADDITION TO MINUTES OF MEETING:

rtOtfbJ 0 rvtfnUx -

Juru

NOTE:

All required supporting data and fees must be received by noon the
Friday prior to the Planning Commission meeting.
BUS8COZ

/<?c

PLANNING COMMISSION AGENDA
DECEMBER 7, 1993
5:30 P.M.
102 SOOTH TREMONT
TREMONTON, DT 84337
ITEM #1 - APPROVAL OF MINUTES
ITEM #2 - APPROVAL OF AGENDA
ITEM #3 - REZONING GIBBS REQUEST
ITEM #4 - CONDITIONAL USE- WEST SIDE CHEVRON-NEW SIGN
ITEM #5 - CONDITIONAL USE- HOME BUSINESS- SHARPENING SERVICE- BRUCE
SNOOK- 771 S 540 W.
ITEM #6 - CONDITIONAL USE- TAX ONE- INSIDE KENT'S THRIFTWAY
ITEM #7 - CONDITIONAL USE- LUBE CENTER - DEAN POTTER- WEST MAIN
ITEM #8 - CONDITIONAL USE - PERMISSION FOR PRE-FAB HOME ON CEMENT
FOUNDATION- KEN FIRTH
ITEM #9 - CONDITIONAL USE - HOME BUSINESS- K.B. DRAFTING- KELLY
BENNETT- 682 S 634 W
ITEM #10- FRANK KARNLEY PLAT AMENDMENT
ITEM #11- CONDITIONAL USE REVIEW- MICHELLE HARPER- BAKING SPECIALTY

IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO ATTEND THIS MEETING PLEASE CONTACT THE CITY
OFFICE AT 257-3324.
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES NEEDING SPECIAL ASSISTANCE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THIS MEETING SHOULD CONTACT SHARRI OYLER NO LATER
THAN 48 HOURS PRIOR TO THE MEETING.
NOTICE WAS POSTED DECEMBER 3, 1993 A DATE NOT LESS THAN 24 HOURS
PRIOR TO THE DATE AND TIME OF THE MEETING AND REMAINED SO POSTED
UNTIL AFTER SAID MEETING. A COPY OF THE AGENDA WAS DELIVERED TO
THE LEADER (NEWSPAPER) ON DECEMBER 3, 1993.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN R. POTTER, to Reed W. Hadfield, MANN,
HADFIELD & THORNE, Attorney for Defendant Reta Chadaz, 98 North
Main, P.O. Box 876, Brigham City, Utah 84302, and Jeff R Thorne,
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE, Attorney for Defendants Gary Bywater and
Karleen C. Bywater, at 98 North Main, P.O. Box 876
Brigham
City,
/ U #{
XJ J . JL Vj XXCU
Utah 84302, postage prepaid, this ^
day of. -Geceuuj^ir > 1 9 9 6 .

Secretary

(n^nhtl^ar^

potter.aff/mjg
T-6480

DLSON 6c HOGGAN P C
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
8 8 WEST CENTER
P O BOX 5 2 5
LOGAN UTAH 8 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5
<801) 7 5 2 1551

TREMONTON OFFICE
1 2 3 EAST MAIN
P O BOX 1 1 5
TREMONTON UTAH 6 4 3 3 7
<801) 2 5 7 3 8 8 5

M

PLANNING COMMISSION MEETING
DECEMBER 7, 1993
MEMBERS PRESENT:
MAX WEESE
GERALD SMITH
CAROL TURLEY
STEVE JENSEN
STAN STOKES

PEGGY HOFFMAN
DON MEYER
RICH WOODWORTH, CITY MANAGER
SHARRI OYLER, SECRETARY

ITEM #1 - Motion made by Gerald Smith of accept the minutes of the
November 16 meeting and the December 2 meeting. Second by Don
Meyer* All approved.
ITEM #2 - Motion made by Max Weese to accept the agenda with the
addition of #12 - Mr. Canfield plat amendment and #13 - York Coburn
request for a mobile office unit at Tremonton Lumber• Second by
Gerald Smith. All approved.
ITEM #3 - Gibbs rezoning request - Request for two homes and a
business on there property on 1000 North. They request that the
two homes be connected with a sun room. In a R 1 20 zone no
business is allowed and only single housing is allowed.
The
commission can't spot zone to allow this. The homes can't be
hooked together, there must be 20 feet between the edge of the roof
and the two homes.
They must comply with the side yard
requirements. Carports with no obstacles blocking the way# just an
open carportf can be one foot inside the property line. A garage
can be 10 feet inside the property line. This is for fire safety
requirements. The two separate homes would each require their own
septic tank, and two separate water lines must be ran, one for each
home. This property is divided as a minor subdivision so it would
be easy to replat. A survey is required to show they are two
separate taxable properties. There is no problem with storing
equipment in the building, but no business is allowed to be
conducted on the property.
A office may be located in the
building, but no work can be conducted in the building.
ITEM #4 - Westside Chevron requesting a new sign. They will be
relocating the existing sign, from the front of the building to the
side. It will be higher than the Greenline Equipment sign, so
neither sign would be obstructing the other. They will take the
one sign down the same time the new on is put up. Motion made by
Gerald Smith the grant the conditional use for the new position of
the sign, with a 6 month review. Second by Stan Stokes. All
approved.
ITEM #5 - Conditional Use request by Bruce Snook for a sharpening
service. He would be sharpening saws, blades, knifes, etc* He
will be doing this in a shed, there will be very little noise. He
has notified his neighbors. No signs of advertisement should be
posted and no inventory can be stored there. Motion by Steve

Jensen to grant the Conditional Use with a review in 6 months*
Second by Peggy Hoffman. All approved*
ITEM #6 - Conditional Use request for Tax One office inside Kent's
Thriftway*
They would be located inside Kent's by the bakery.
They will only be there during the tax season, from January through
April 15th* There will be one person working at all times and on
occasion 2. They will be doing tax preparing, electronic filing
and answering questions*
They will be paying Kent's on a
percentage basis*
This would be a business inside a business* There are several
others in the city.
Stan Stokes made the motion to grant the
Conditional Use for Tax One with a review in 6 months* Second by
Max Weese* All approved*
ITEM #7 - Conditional Use request for a
center. They will
have two bays, it will be only for regular automotive cars and
trucks, not for semi's. Not much parking is required, they will be
done with a vehicle in 15 minutes. He has purchased the property
from Fronk's to Lucky's. The building is 20 ft X 42 ft. The sewer
is located at the back of the lot, the water is in the front. All
signs will comply with the ordinance* Will be starting in March.
Don Meyer made the motion to accept the plan, must meet all EPA,
health, fire and engineer requirements with satisfactory black top,
with a review in 6 months. Second by Steve Jensen. All approved.
ITEM #8

- Ken

Firth

request

for

a pre-fah

home

on

a

cement

foundation. The home meets all Hud standards, it is a new unit.
It will be on a cement basement foundation, with walk out access.
They do have approval for a septic tank. Carol Turley made the
motion to accept the plan as stated* Second by Max Weese. All
approved.
ITEM #9 - Conditional Use for a home business.
This
is done in a room in the basement of the home. All the work is
done on computer. Neighbors have been notified. It is not allowed
to advertise or have any inventory. Gerald Smith made the motion
to grant the Conditional Use with a review in 6 months. Second by
Peggy Hoffman. All approved.
ITEM #10 - Steve Jensen excused himself from the board for this
issue concerning a conflict of interest. Gerald Smith conducted.
Frank Karnely plat amendment- to change the existing plat from
three one acre lots to 4 one acre lots. They will be 255 ft deep
X 170 feet wide. This was divided as a minor subdivision, a survey
is required.
Stan Stokes made the motion to accept the plat
change.
Second by Don Meyer.
All approved.
Steve Jensen
abstained.
ITEM #11 - Conditional Use review for Michelle Harper, baking
specialty cookies. No complaints have been made. Steve Jensen
made the motion to grant the Conditional Use indefinitely/
requesting I find out if it is still in operation. Second by
Gerald Smith. All approved.

learned that the property dropped sharply off of Main Street and it
was impossible for anyone to drive off of the curb from Main Street
without high centering or dropping so sharp into the terrain as to
make it impassable.

Also, at the South end of the property a ditch

runs East and West making it impossible to cross said property with
vehicular traffic.

I discovered that there had never been any use

of the property for any right-of-way or roadways.
3.

Defendant Reta Chadaz claims that this right-of-way has

been used as access to take farm machinery and equipment to and
from Reta Chadaz property when the property had been farmed.

I

clearly deny this allegation based on the physical inspection,
since the obstructions across the property would have made it
impossible to take farm machinery or equipment through this 66 foot
wide section and I am not aware of Defendant ever taking equipment
across this property.
4.
by me.

Defendant Reta Chadaz also denies she ever was contacted
However, I affirmatively state that I called Reta Chadaz,

as well as all other surrounding owners, including Fronk Chevrolet,
Lucky's

Restaurant,

Mrs.

Johnny

Chadaz,

and

Bill

Hatch,

and

indicated to all of them that I was going to build on the property
and

apply

for

a

building

permit,

and

that

if

they

had

any

objections whatsoever to this construction of a building across
said property, that they should appear at the zoning meeting to
object.

(See

objections.)

copy

of

zoning

meeting

minutes

showing

no

Defendant Reta Chadaz stated by phone that it would

make no difference anyway and failed to tell me that she claimed
any right-of-way across the property.
5.
DLSON 8c HOGGAN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT L A W

I specifically state that Maurice Staples never had a

discussion with me until after I had already fully constructed all
of the improvements on the property.

This was several years after

8 8 WEST CENTER
P.O. BOX 5 2 5

I had purchased the property.

The date when Notice of Bona Fide

LOGAN. UTAH 8 4 3 2 3 - 0 5 2 5
<801) 7 5 2 - 1 5 5 1

TREMONTON OFFICE
1 2 3 EAST MAIN
P.O. BOX 1 1 5
TREMONTON. UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
(801)257-3885

purchaser status is to be construed is primarily on the date of
purchase.
informed

I admit that I talked to Maurice Staples and was finally
that

someone

was

claiming

a

right-of-way

across

my

property, but not until April of 1995, and I immediately went to

) &
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Addendum 13
Reed W. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne, #1289
Attorneys for Defendant Reta Chadaz
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main
P. 0. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone 723-3404
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEAN R. POTTER and
DIANE B. POTTER dba
Dean's Superlube,

]
(

Plaintiffs,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF MAURICE STAPLES

J
]

RETA CHADAZ (Party who claims ]
66 foot Right-of-Way
GARY BYWATER and KARLEEN
BYWATER (On Warranty Deed);

)

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INS. CO. ' )
(On Title Policy);

Civil No. 960000272 QT
Judge:

and JOHN DOES 1-10, who may
claim an interest in said
Right-of-Way.
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER )
Maurice Staples being first duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

Sometime after the purchase by the plaintiffs of the

property set forth in plaintiff's Complaint in the above-entitled
matter,

this

affiant

and

the

plaintiff,

Dean

Potter,

were

discussing the subject of the property Dean Potter had purchased
upon which to build his business.

This discussion took place at

the Cross Roads Cafe in Tremonton, Utah,
2.

Reta Chadaz nka Reta Hodson prior to this time had

advised this affiant that she had a right of way across this
property to her approximately 35 acres of farm land to the south of
said right of way. This affiant had leased this property from Reta
Chadaz and had paid her rent for said property*
3.

When this affiant advised Dean Potter that Reta Chadaz

claimed an interest in the 66 foot right of way, Dean Potter
requested this affiant to furnish him a copy of documentation
showing this to be the fact.
4.

This affiant obtained from Reta Chadaz a copy of an

Agreement (see Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit A) and took
said Agreement and showed it to Dean Potter. Dean Potter requested
that he be allowed to make a copy of said Agreement and this
permission was given. This affiant picked up the copy he had taken
to Dean Potter later that same day. The only improvements that had
been made upon the property disputed in this lawsuit were a fence
had been removed and some gravel had been placed on said property.
5.

The plaintiff, Dean Potter, advised this affiant that if

Reta Chadaz had a right of way through this property, that Bywater
would have to refund to Dean Potter the money he had paid for such
property, and that at such time as the road was put in, he would
use it for an entrance to his property.
Further affiant sayeth not.
DATED this

/ -^

day of

/

Ast/.

1996.
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QUIT CLAIM DEED-

HERITAGE PARK PLAZA, INC., a Utah Corporation,
of Kaysville, County of Davis, State of Utah

GRANTOR

hereby QUIT CLAIMS to RETA CHADAZ,

GRANTEE

for the sum of Ten ($10.00) Dollars and other valuable
consideration in and to the following described tract
of land situate in Box Elder County, State of Utah,
to-wit:
A right of way over the East 66 feet of the following
described property for the purpose of a proposed road:
Part of the Northwest quarter of Section "10, Township
11 North, Range 3 West, SLB&M:
Beginning at a point on the South line of /theM highway
right-of-way which is located South 89*51 47 West
637.42 feet along the section line and South 0*35'46"
West 50.00 feet from the Northeast corner of the
Northwest quarter of Section 10, Township 11 North,
Range 3 West, SLB&M; point of beginning also being
located North 89°51'47" East 3.00 feet from the
Northeast corner
of Plat R, Tremonton City Survey,
thence South 0#35'46" West 300.05 feet, thence North
89*47'46" East 231.06 feet, thence North 299.75 feet to
the South highway right-of-way line (point also being
the Northwest corner of the Harris Truck and Equipment,
Inc. property), thence South 89°51'47" West 227.94 feet
along said South highway right-of-way line to the point
of beginning. Contains 1.58 acres.
It is the intent of the conveyance to transfer to the
Grantee all of the interest designated as "SUBJECT TO A
RIGHT-OF-WAY OVER THE EAST 66 FEET OF SAID PROPERTY,
FOR THE PURPOSE OF A PROPOSED ROAD" as set forth in
that Special Warranty Deed recorded in Book^23iPpages
680 and 681 of the Official Records of the Box Elder
County Recorder's Office in Box Elder County, Utah.
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Help

00:02:30 | C N E P S | CONNECT

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
CORPORATIONS DATA SHARE

ENTER NAME HERITAGE PARK
ENTER THE NAME OF THE ENTITY YOU ARE SEARCHING
FOR AND THEN HIT THE RETURN KEY

HIT CTRL "B" KEY TO RETURN TO THE CORPORATION MENU
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Utility
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20

DB
CO
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LC
TM
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CO
DB
CO
DB
CO
CO
DB
CO
CO
CO
DB
CO
DB
CO

190748
088409
109545
004441
024940
064223
118160
141462
143408
206998
160282
080229
191690
209431
154062
097781
020335
067031
147545
113473

HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE
HERITAGE

SELECT NUMBER

Settings

Help

00:02:44 | C N E P S | CONNECT
ST-DATE ST

PARK CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION
PARK PLAZA, INC.
PARK TOWNHOUSE ASSOCIATION
PARK, L.C.
PARLOUR
PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS, INC.
PHONES
PHOTOGRAPHY
PICTURES, INC.
PLACE ASSISTED LIVING
PLANNERS, INC.
PLANNING CONSULTANTS, INC.
PLUMBING
PLUMBING SERVICES, INC.
PRESERVATION AND RECYCLING INC.
PRESERVE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
PRESS PUBLISHING CO.
PRODUCTION, INC.
PRODUCTIONS
PRODUCTIONS, INC.

03/83
12/86
/
/
12/76
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05/97
/
/
07/94
03/85
/
00/00
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06/87
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12/77
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HIT "RETURN" TO SEE MORE; CTRL "B" TO GO BACK

File
Telephone
Utility
Settings
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UTAH DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS & COMMERCIAL CODE
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••CORPORATION INFORMATION - SCREEN 1**
STATUS: INVOLUNTARILY DISSOLVED 03/31/83-FAILURE TO PAY TAXES
NAME IN HOME STATE:
PRINCIPAL ADDRESS:
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